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THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 
REBECCA]. HAMILTON* 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was neuer meant to supplant 
the domestic prosecution of international crimes. And yet, the Court is now 
entering its second decade of operations in four African nations, with no 
plan for exit in sight. While the literature on the ICC to date has devoted 
much space to considerations involved in the Court's entry into situations, 
this Article identifies the looming need for the ICC to consider when and how 
to exit situations. However, the consideration of exit revea/,s an immediate 
problem: While the Court's constitutive document, the Rome Statute, pro­
vides ample guidance on when the Court may enter a new situation, it offers 
no explicit guidance on exit whatsoever. This Article fills that lacuna, pro­
posing a framework to guide exit decisionmaking that draws on both statu­
tory and policy prescriptions, as well as insights from analogous interna­
tional institutions. The Article is driven by a concern that the failure to start 
planning for exit undercuts the Court's placement within a system of com­
plementarity, creating a moral hazard in which domestic justice systems 
(and those who could support them) come to rely on the ICC in lieu of 
developing their own capacity to prosecute international crimes. Framed in 
the positive, planning for exit could present an opportunity to catalyze the 
development of domestic justice systems and provide a secondary benefit of 
alleviating the current strain on the Court's resources. The consideration of 
exit decisionmaking also provides a new occasion to assess and extend our 
understanding of prosecutorial discretion, an issue that the Court has been 
grappling with since its inception. This Article argues that the Prosecutor's 
ability to navigate exit in a way that is acceptable to the Court's key stake­
holders will be crucial to the ICC's ability to implement its mandate over the 
long term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was never meant 
to supplant the domestic prosecution of international crimes. 
Situated within a system of complementarity, this "court of last 
resort" was designed to operate only in instances where states 
themselves are unable or unwilling to prosecute. As the Court 
pursues its tenth year of operations in both the Central Afri-
2014) THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 3 can Republic and Sudan, and its eleventh year in the Demo­cratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, it is an appropriate juncture to recall this aspect of the Court's design. This Article argues that to avoid the specter of perpetual presence in every situation it enters, the ICC needs to start considering when and how to exit existing situations. 1 The problem, however, is that existing statutory sources provide no guidance on how the Court might go about doing this.2 To fill this void, I propose a framework for exit decisionmaking that is benchmark-driven but acknowledges that the Court may sometimes need to exit a situation under conditions of only partial success, or even failure. Both the identification of exit as an issue and the pro­posed framework through which to guide exit decisionmaking mark a new direction within the scholarship on the ICC, which to date has devoted much attention to issues related to the Court's entry into new situations. Entry has also been a preoc­cupation of the Court itself; however, it is time to update this focus, recognizing that the Court today is quite different from what it was at its inception in 2002. When the ICC's founding Prosecutor, Luis Moreno­Ocampo, took office in June 2003, his first order of business was to find situations to investigate.3 He began his work against an inauspicious backdrop, and it was unclear whether the Court would ever secure enough cases to become fully func-
1. "Situation" is a term of art used in the Rome Statute. It refers to the
location of the alleged crimes under investigation. Rod Rast.an, Situation and Case: Defining the Parameters, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT AND 
COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 422 (Carsten Stahn & 
Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011). It is distinct from the term "cases," which 
refers to the particular crimes prosecuted within a situation. Id. at 437-38. 
2. Under the statutory interpretation advanced in this Article, the deci­
sion to exit would be taken by the Prosecutor. See infra Part II. But this Arti­
cle refers to ICC exit, rather than prosecution exit, since from the perspec­
tive of most of the Court's stakeholders, the internal divisions between differ­
ent arms of the Court are quite opaque. 
3. Paul Seils, among the earliest of the lawyers to join the Office of the
Prosecutor, notes that even in more recent times, "there remains a sense of 
'looking for business.'" Paul Seils, Making Complementarity Work: Maximizing the Limited Ro'le of the Prosecutor, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND 
COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 989 (Carsten Stahn & 
Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011). 
4 INI'ERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 47:1 tional. 4 But fast-forward to 2014, and the Court finds itself in a very different situation.5 While still deeply controversial in many quarters, the Court has secured itself a prominent place on the international stage. Far from being short of cases, its docket is now bulging. Yet, such success raises new challenges, including the question of exit. The term "exit," as used in this Article, refers to public notification that the ICC is ceasing new operations in any of the situations in which it is already involved. It does not mean that existing arrest warrants would be nullified, or that defend­ants already subject to arrest warrants would not proceed to trial (although, as discussed later, under appropriate circum­stances, such trials could potentially take place at the domestic level instead of at the ICC). In theory, exit could be unspoken: The Court could end active operations in a situation without making any public an­nouncement to that effect. Indeed, one might argue that such a scenario would be optimal, in the sense that those who had committed crimes but had not yet been indicted would be un­likely to draw attention to themselves by committing further crimes, fearing future prosecution, and those considering committing future war crimes would be deterred, fearing they would become subjects of an ICC investigation. 4. Writing soon after the Rome Statute was adopted, future U.S. Ambas­sador to the United Nations John Bolton argued the Court should be left "to the obscurity it so richly deseives." John Bolton, Courting Danger: What's Wrong with the International Criminal Court?, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Dec. 1, 1998), http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/inter national-organizations/ courting-danger/. Throughout the first term of the Bush administration, the United States appeared to be doing everything it could to emasculate the Court. See, e.g., American Service Members Protec­tion Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421 et seq. (2002) (cutting economic and military aid to countries who had joined the ICC without signing a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States); Draft U.N. Security Council Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2002/712 Qune 30, 2002) (proposal to extend the U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina vetoed by the United States on the grounds that nationals of states not party to the ICC had not been granted immunity from ICC prosecution in the draft resolution). 5. The U.S. position has warmed to a stance best described as construc­tive engagement, and 122 countries have joined the court. States Parties to the &me Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/en_ menus/ asp/ states% 20parties/Pages/ the% 20states % 20parties %20to % 20the %20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Aug. 22, 2014). 
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On balance, however, such de facto exit seems ill-advised. 
Firstly, it works against transparency, one of the principles gen­
erally seen as contributing to the legitimacy of international 
organizations.6 Secondly, any deterrent effect of perceived 
ICC presence in a situation will inevitably wear thin once it 
becomes clear that the ICC is not, in fact, still conducting op­
erations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the absence 
of a public announcement of withdrawal also precludes the 
possibility of exit serving as a catalyst for capacity-building or­
ganizations, whether U.N. actors or private non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), to ramp up their efforts to support the 
domestic system to handle any residual cases in the situation, 
or indeed any new cases in the future. And, ultimately, deter­
rence by virtue of a functioning domestic system is a more sus­
tainable goal than deterrence by way of an expensive and dis­
tant court. 
At present, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has no 
exit strategy in place for any of the situations in which it oper­
ates. This is problematic because it risks undermining the sys­
tem of complementarity, so integral to the design of the 
Court, by creating a moral hazard scenario whereby domestic 
justice systems default towards dependency on the ICC for the 
prosecution of international crimes. This was not a risk that 
early watchers of the Court foresaw. Most believed that the 
possibility of the ICC's entering a given state would spur that 
state's government to take up its own prosecutions, saving it­
self from ICC encroachment.7 To date, however, the reverse 
seems to have been more common, with ICC involvement de­
creasing incentives for domestic prosecutions.8 In light of this 
6. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administra­tive Law, 68 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005) (defining global administra­
tive law as encompassing mechanisms to ensure that, inter alia, adequate 
standards of transparency are met). 
7. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The Inter­national Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International justice, 49 HARv. INT'L LJ. 53, 57 (2008) (hoping for "a virtuous circle in 
which the Court stimulates the exercise of domestic jurisdiction through the 
threat of international intervention"). 
8. See SARAH NoUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE C AT­
ALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND Su­
DAN 396-99 (2014) (finding that the assumptions underlying initial expecta­
tions that the ICC would have a catalyzing effect on domestic prosecutions 
must be reviewed, both because the normative force of complementarity has 
 
6 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 development, this Article argues that a well-constructed exit strategy has the potential to revitalize the complementarity sys­tem that the Court's founders hoped would be more active than it has been in the first decade of the Court's existence. Exit would also generate a secondary benefit by releasing pressure on the Court's current resources. In 2009, the prose­cution's 217 staff members were prosecuting eight cases. In the projected budget for 2014, 217 staff were responsible for prosecuting twenty cases.9 While one should expect the Court to become more efficient in its operations over time, such stretching of resources cannot be limitless, and already com­plaints have been lodged that the mismatch between the Court's resources and the number of situations it is involved in has led to staff burnout and an over-reliance on secondary sources of information that may not stand up at trial.10 By exit­ing situations in appropriate circumstances, the Court would 
been undermined by its lack of legal obligation, and because the states' cost­
benefit analysis of undertaking domestic prosecutions to avoid ICC interven­
tion has not played out as expected). With respect to the latter, the assumed 
cost to the sovereignty of the state in which the ICC intervenes may in fact be 
seen by the state as a benefit, as has been the case in Uganda, where the 
government has been able to outsource prosecution of a rebel group to the 
ICC while avoiding ICC scrutiny of alleged crimes by its own government 
forces. And even in situations where the sovereignty cost to the state is high, 
as with the ICC's intervention in Sudan, where the ICC has investigated gov­
ernment activity, these costs can be avoided by means other than comple­
mentarity, such as by the state's refusal to execute arrest warrants. These 
findings run contrary. to the expectations of early writers who assumed that, 
faced with the threat of ICC intervention, states would prefer to undertake 
domestic prosecutions. 
9. 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AsSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICIAL 
REcoRDs 34, ICC-ASP /7 /20 (Nov. 2008), availab/,e at http:/ /icc-cpi.int/icc 
docs/asp_docs/ A.pdf; cf. 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT, AssEMBLY OF 
STATES PARTIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICIAL RECORDS 
190, ICC-ASP/12/20 (Nov. 2013), availab/,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/icc 
docs/asp_docs/ASP12/OR/ICC-ASP-12-20-ENG-OR-Vol-I-18Decl230.AV 
.pdf. 
10. See Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA]. INT'L L. & FOR­
EIGN AFF. 121, 130-133 (2009) (discussing the problems associated with the 
ICC's reliance on third parties to perform investigations); AM. UNIV. WAR 
CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES, AND 
TECHNIQUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT'S OFFICE OF THE PROSE­
CUTOR 4, 12 (2012), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/ 
icc/documents/ICCReportl6.pdf (finding that "investigators hired by the 
OTP have left the Office due to burn out resulting from being over-
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 7 be in a better position to accommodate the demands on its resources. Given the scale of crimes generally involved in situations the ICC enters, it is unlikely that exit would occur only when all possible suspects in a situation have been investigated and prosecuted by the ICC. And while, in an ideal world, exit would not occur unless remaining potential suspects were be­ing investigated and prosecuted by domestic authorities in lieu of the ICC, even this may be an unrealistic goal to have for all situations, given the debilitated state of some domestic justice systems and the time necessary to get them to a point where they can handle the investigation and prosecution of interna­tional crimes. Constraints on resources and cooperation fail­ures may mean that, in many instances, exit will not be simply the reverse of the statutory conditions of entry. In other words, although the Court enters situations only when domestic jus­tice systems are unable or unwilling to prosecute, 11 it may need to exit situations before the domestic system is able and willing to prosecute. As a result, exit decisionmaking will need to factor in the possibility of suboptimal exit scenarios, in situa­tions where there is no guarantee that remaining suspects will be investigated or prosecuted by either the ICC or domestic authorities. While this Article argues that the Court must start consid­ering exit, it recognizes that the lack of guidance from existing sources poses a significant problem for the ICC, which must develop its own process for exit decisionmaking. With respect to the question of how to exit a situation once a decision to exit has been made, there is a growing body of best practices to draw on from the experiences of the closure of the Interna­tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (IC1Y) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (!CTR) (to­gether, "the ad hoc tribunals") .12 
stretched" and describing the reliance on secondary sources as "problem­
atic"). 
11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 1, 
2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
12. Indeed, the ICC's legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties, 
placed the question of exit on its annual meeting for the first time at the end 
of 2013 with a paper to discuss what lessons such tribunals may have for the 
ICC. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Court 
on Complementarity: Completion of ICC Activities in a Situation Country, 
8 INF .ERNATJONAL LAW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 But consideration of how to exit does not address the an­tecedent, and perhaps more challenging issue, of when to exit. And on this question, the ad hoc tribunals have little to offer, since their exit decisions have been made by the political body that established and funded the tribunals-the U.N. Security Council. By contrast, the decision to exit a situation at the ICC appears to fall within the discretion of the Prosecutor. 13With the Court's constitutive document, the Rome Stat­ute, providing no direct guidance on exit, the degree of prosecutorial discretion involved in the decision to exit is sig­nificant. And while the first decade of literature on the ICC focused heavily on the higher degree of discretion the ICC Prosecutor had to enter situations as compared with his coun­terparts in the ad hoc tribunals,14 this Article is the first to rec­ognize that an even greater degree of discretionary decision­making is involved when it comes to exit. 
ICC-ASP/12/32 (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/ asp_docs/ ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-32-ENG.pdf. This is a welcome, if 
belated, de­velopment. However, the report failed to recognize that the 
experiences of these temporary tribunals provide little guidance on the 
question of when the ICC, as a permanent institution, should exit a 
situation. 
13. The question of who should decide when the ICC exits a situation 
is explored in Part II. 
14. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone & Nicole Fritz, "In the Interests of justice" and Independent Referral: The ICC Prosecutor's Unprecedented Powers, 13 
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 655, 657 (2000) (arguing that the degree of discretion 
afforded to the ICC Prosecutor constitutes a "fundamental departure" 
from the ad hoc tribunals); William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" at the Inter­national Criminal Court, 43 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 535, 541 (2010) (noting 
that "for the first time, we have an international criminal tribunal 
where the choice of situations for prosecution is the prerogative of a 
judicial official within the institution and not a political body outside it"). 
Unlike the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals were limited to investigating in 
situations established ex ante by the U.N. Security Council. For instance, the 
Council limited the geo­ graphic jurisdiction of the ICTR to Rwanda, 
meaning that the ICTR Prosecu­tor had no discretion to pursue crimes that 
took place over the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
However, this is not to say that there are no checks on the ICC Prosecutor's 
discretion. The Rome Statute that estab­lished the Court defines the 
geographic and temporal limits of the Court's jurisdiction, and when the 
Prosecutor seeks to open an investigation into a situation proprio motu, a 
Pre-Trial Chamber composed of three international judges must approve 
the decision. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 15. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
can also review the decision of the Prosecutor not to pro­ ceed with an 
investigation or prosecution if the decision was taken solely "in the interests 
ofjustice." Id. art. 53(3)(b). 
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 9 The dearth of scholarship on the question of exit in this field parallels the comparatively greater attention that has been placed on entry, as compared to exit, in other interna­tional interventions until quite recently. 15 This Article argues that, as scholars and practitioners in these other settings are finding, the Prosecutor's ability to navigate exit in a way that is acceptable to the Court's key stakeholders will be crucial to the perceived legitimacy of the ICC's work going forward. This is particularly important for a Court that is entirely dependent on others, including governments and civil society organiza­tions, for the access it needs to investigation sites and wit­nesses, 16 and for the enforcement powers required to execute its judgments. 17 In short, a poorly managed exit from one situ­ation is likely to impact the ICC's ability to enter new situations in the future. Part I of this Article describes what I term a "complemen­tarity imperative" driving the need to start considering exit. It argues that for the Court to remain in situations without devel­oping any exit strategy risks creating a moral hazard scenario whereby domestic justice systems come to rely on the ICC for the prosecution of international crimes in their territories and, as a result, neither the domestic justice systems nor other actors who could help to build the capacity of those systems have an incentive to plan for prosecuting international crimes domestically. It also observes that exit would have the secon­dary benefits of protecting the Court against perceptions of inefficiency and of alleviating some of the pressure on the Court's resources. It finally considers whether there are any alternatives to exit, describing two approaches other than exit through which the Prosecutor, currently Gambian lawyer Fatou Bensouda, could align workload and resources in a 
15. The first book to look systematically at exit strategies with respect to
international institutions only came out in 2012. See generally ExIT STRATEGIES 
AND STATE BUILDING (Richard Caplan ed., 2012). 
16. See, e.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, The Probl,em of Obtaining Evidence for Interna­
tional Criminal Courts, 22 HuM. RTs. Q. 404, 405 (2000) (arguing that interna­
tional criminal courts "depend on states to provide them with evidence or 
access to evidence"). 
17. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 7, 60-61 (noting the ICC's lack of
enforcement mechanisms and quoting the ICC Prosecutor as stating that 
"ultimately, the decision to uphold the law will be the decision of States Par­
ties"). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 47:1 
world of limited budgets: The Prosecutor could decline to 
enter new situations or she could decide to under-staff existing 
situations in order to free the resources to enter new situa­
tions. However, the costs to the mandate and credibility of the 
Court that are likely to flow from either of these approaches 
render both of them problematic. More importantly, neither 
addresses the fundamental concern about creating positive in­
centives toward complementarity. Only exit planning can ad­
dress this issue. 
Having established the importance of exit, Part II turns to 
the core problem facing the ICC: how to develop a decision­
making process for exit in the absence of clear statutory gui­
dance. Starting with the question of who should make the de­
cision to exit, this Part argues that the decision to exit falls 
within the discretion of the Prosecutor. It then reviews the ex­
isting literature on prosecutorial discretion at the ICC in order 
to identify problems the Prosecutor has faced with discretion­
ary decisionmaking and to extract potential lessons that might 
be usefully applied to exit decisions. Next, this Part turns to a 
search for comparative examples, distinguishing ICC exit from 
the exits undertaken by the ad hoc tribunals, and arguing that 
an ICC exit might most readily be analogized to exit from a 
U.N. peacekeeping operation. Like U.N. peacekeeping, the 
perceptions of the ICC's credibility flowing from its actions in 
one location have an impact on its ability to enter different 
locations in the future. The emphasis, then, is less on the ICC 
as a court, and more on the ICC as a permanent international 
institution. 
Finally, Part III moves from problem to solution. First, it 
draws together both statutory and policy prescriptions to pro­
pose a working definition of success for the purposes of exit. It 
then uses insights from the U.N. peacekeeping context to de­
velop a decisionmaking framework for exit that is guided by 
substantive benchmarks, rather than hard deadlines. While 
completion of cases is the goal, the timeline for considering 
exit begins much earlier than the end of a case, and the Prose­
cutor should engage in a continual process of assessment to 
determine whether benchmarks such as investigative access 
and warrant enforcement are being met, and whether the do­
mestic system in question is developing the capacity to under­
take its own prosecutions. In developing this framework, it be-
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 11 comes clear that the Court's success with respect to exit cannot be divorced from the actions of other entities, especially states. I. WHY ExIT?The ICC is a permanent institution. In the absence of any requirement of institutional closure, such as that facing the ad hoc tribunals, does the ICC really need to exit any situation? The answer is yes, for both principled and pragmatic reasons. The primary reason is what I term the "complementarity im­perative." Remaining permanently in a situation undercuts the principle of complementarity that lies at the heart of the Rome Statute. This principle strives toward a scenario in which states take responsibility for prosecuting international crimes. Beyond this complementarity concern, operating in any situa­tion without a plan for exit may ultimately undermine the Court's reputation by opening it to criticism that the duration of its stay in a situation is the result of inefficiency or, worse yet, intentional delay. Finally, exit would help to alleviate the financial constraints currently facing the Court. At present, the Court's budget is not expanding fast enough to accommo­date the increasing number of situations it is entering, without some cost to the quality of its work.18 A decrease in the quality of the Court's work can, in turn, undermine the credibility of the Court, and ultimately limit its ability to fulfill its mandate of ending impunity. There are, of course, alternative mechanisms to exit for aligning the Court's resources with its workload, namely, refus­ing to enter new situations or purposely under-staffing existing ones. But both generate significant problems for the Court's reputation. One might suggest, then, that the answer is simply to push for the Court to be given more resources. But even in a world of unlimited resources, the complementarity impera­tive alone would still point toward the need for the Court to consider exit. A. The Complementarity ImperativeBy placing the ICC within a system of complementarity, the drafting of the Rome Statute marked a distinct and con­scious decision to depart from the model of the ad hoc tribu-18. See infra Part LC.I.ii.
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nals that were, in many other respects, the Court's contempo­
rary forerunners. The ad hoc tribunals were granted primacy 
over relevant domestic jurisdictions in the prosecution of ge­
nocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. By contrast, 
the ICC was designed to be a "court of last resort" that would 
step in only when domestic justice systems were unable or un­
willing to undertake genuine prosecutions. As the OTP's 2009-
2012 strategy document explained, "the number of cases that 
reach the Court is not a positive measure of effectiveness. Gen­
uine investigations and prosecutions of serious crimes at the 
domestic level may illustrate the successful functioning of the 
Rome system." 19 
This principle of complementarity is central to the func­
tioning of the international criminal justice system that was 
conceived of by the drafters of the Rome Statute. As Carsten 
Stahn notes, it is "both unrealistic and undesirable" to imagine 
the ICC being able to prosecute all crimes within its jurisdic­
tion. 20 As the Court strives toward its ambitious mandate of 
putting "an end to impunity,"21 it is clear that domestic systems 
must take up their share of the work. Yet by conducting its 
operations without any plan for exit, the Court risks becoming 
a stand-in for, rather than a catalyst to, the domestic prosecu­
tion of international crimes.22
Under the Statute, the Court only enters a situation if the 
domestic justice system is unable or unwilling to conduct its 
19. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy
2009-2012, ,r 79 (Feb. 1, 2010) availab/,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdon 
lyres/66A8DCDC-3650-45 l 4-AA62-D229D l l 28F65 /281506/ OTPProsecutori 
a!Strategy20092013.pdf. 
20. Carsten Stahn, Introduction: Bridges over Troub/,ed Waters?, in l THE IN­
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARIIT: FROM THEORY TO 
PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 3. 
21. Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl.
22. By saying there is a risk that the ICC becomes a stand-in for the do­
mestic justice system, I do not mean to suggest that the two are interchange­
able, or that the ICC can ever serve as a complete substitute for a function­
ing domestic justice system. Quite apart from the qualitative differences be­
tween the two, the ICC will only ever be able to prosecute a fraction of those 
cases that a functioning domestic system could prosecute. But the ICC can 
be seen as a stand-in in respect of the fact that for as long as it is present in 
an atrocity or post-atrocity situation, other actors, including the domestic 
state, can point to the ICC as the mechanism responsible for dealing with 
accountability, thereby alleviating its own responsibility in that regard. 
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own prosecutions. Thus, at the point of entry, there are no 
complementarity concerns. However, with respect to the ques­
tion of whether the domestic jurisdiction will become willing 
and able to prosecute at a future point, the Court's ongoing 
presence in the country risks the creation of a moral hazard 
unless it has an exit strategy in place. 
Long identified in economic literature, moral hazard sce­
narios arise when actors do not have to bear the consequences 
of their (in)actions, leading to a reduction in their incentive to 
partake in a particular desired behavior. 23 In concrete terms, 
one may consider a typical scenario in an insurance setting, 
where a "no-fault" policy reduces the incentive for policyhold­
ers to protect their belongings relative to what they would have 
done in the absence of insurance. 24 
Translating this into the ICC scenario, the desired behav­
ior in a system of complementarity is the prosecution of inter­
national crimes by domestic justice systems. As noted earlier, 
the ICC does not enter a situation if the domestic justice sys­
tem is able and willing to conduct prosecutions, and so it is not 
the ICC's intervention per se that creates the moral hazard. But 
by continuing its operations without any exit strategy in place, 
the Court reduces the incentive for the domestic system (and 
other regional and international actors who might support the 
domestic system) to begin planning for the prosecution of 
these crimes in the future. 
This is the dynamic that played out in the former Yugosla­
via, where, in advance of publicizing its exit strategy, the IC1Y 
determined that there were no national judicial systems within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that could undertake the prosecution 
of international crimes once it closed. 25 Only once the IC1Y 
23. For an overview of moral hazard, see generally Mark V. Pauly, TheEconomics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 531 Uune 1968). 
24. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure The­
ory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RisK & lNs. 4, 6 (1983) ("[T]he 
more and better insurance that is provided against some contingency, the 
less incentive individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the less 
they bear the full consequences of their actions."). 
25. See Letter Dated 17 June 2002 from the U.N. Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 Uune 19, 2002), 
(summarizing the ICTY's view that "it would not be possible to for it to refer 
cases to the national jurisdictions of that State as they currently are organ­
ized and function"). 
14 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 started publicizing its exit strategy did the tribunal, interna­tional support actors, and the domestic parties themselves be­gin to try and ensure there would be a domestic mechanism for handling residual cases. Three years after the ICTY first announced a plan for exit, the War Crimes Division of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina commenced opera­tions. 26 As long as the domestic system and those who could sup­port it believe that the ICC will do the work, these parties do not bear the consequences of their failure to develop the do­mestic system, and there is a reduced incentive for them to develop a strategy to take on the prosecution of international crimes in the future. By contrast, were the Court to signal its future exit to the domestic justice system and other relevant parties in any situation in which it operated, both the incentive and the time would exist for these actors to begin planning for how the domestic justice system might handle remaining or future prosecutions in the absence of the ICC. B. Perceived InefficiencyThe experience of the ad hoc tribunals shows that pa­tience with the pace of war crimes trials is generally limited. Criticisms have been made of both the ICTY and !CTR that 26. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE FOR ATROCIIT CRIMES: LESSONS OFINTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR TRIALS BEFORE THE STATE COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/03/ 12/justice-atrocity-crimes-O ("[T]he War Crimes Chamber began operations in March 2005."). The experience of Rwandan justice mechanisms in rela­tion to the !CTR provides a counterpoint to the IC1Y example; however, Rwanda seems likely to be a sui generis case. Although the Rwandan govern­ment initially supported the idea of an international tribunal for the prose­cution of crimes committed during the 1994 genocide, it ultimately voted against the U.N. Security Council resolution establishing the tribunal be­cause of the IC1Y's restriction against the death penalty, the presence of the tribunal outside Rwanda, and the fact that those convicted would serve their time injails outside of Rwanda. SeeU.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (statement of the Rwandan representa­tive Mr. Bakuramutsa). Thus, far from a moral hazard scenario, the Rwandan government never depended on the ICTR's existence to begin with. Concurrently with the ICTR starting its operations, the Rwandan gov­ernment implemented domestic justice mechanisms to respond to the atroc­ities, firstly through the regular court system, and later through a traditional system known as Gacaca. There is no comparable situation for any of the countries in which the ICC currently has operations. 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 15 their operations are too slow;27 indeed, this has been de­scribed as the consensus view of international tribunals over­all. 28 Independent from the question of whether international justice is in fact too slow, it certainly flows from the principle of complementarity inherent in the ICC's design that states that join and fund the Court do not expect it to remain in any situation on a permanent basis. On this metric alone, the cur­rent situation, whereby the Court operates without any exit strategies in place, creates a risk that the states will start to view the Court as inefficient. Indeed, the absence of an exit strategy may increase the likelihood of the Court's actually being ineffi­cient. Without any sense of a completion point in a situation, there is little incentive for the Court to increase the speed of any of its activities, even when it has the capacity to do so.29 Ultimately, state perceptions of inefficiency, whether accurate or not, are problematic on a pragmatic level, because the Court relies on states for the funding it needs to fulfill its man­date. C. Resource ConstraintsThe Court's budget is growing at a rate that is vastly short of what is needed to enter more situations while still maintain­ing the quality of the Court's work. Over the past five years, the OTP's budget has increased by 17 percent, whereas the number of situations in which it is operating has increased by 100 percent.30 Although one would hope the OTP has become 27. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, u,ssons from the
International Criminal Tribunals, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNA ­TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITI' AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 53 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) (describing delays in the estab­lishment of tribunals as "not just undignified; they are damaging"). 28. Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can
Be]usticeDelivered, 50 HARv. INT'L LJ. 323, 323-324 (2009). 29. The satirical observer of bureaucratic systems, C. Northcote Parkin­son, may well have put it best when he noted that "work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion." C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's 
Law, EcoNOMIST (Nov. 19, 1955), available at http://www.economist.com/ node/14116121. 30. In 2009, the OTP was active in four situations and had a budget of24.6 million Euros. 2 INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, AssEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICIAL REcoRDs, ICC-ASP /7 /20, supra note 9, at 7. By the end of 2013, the OTP was 
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more efficient over time as procedures are streamlined and 
staff experience grows, the mismatch between resources and 
workload seems greater than one would reasonably expect any 
efficiency gains to compensate.31 According to Dr. Phil Clark, 
an expert in international justice, "[t]he court operates on a 
shoestring budget, which greatly affects all of its work, particu­
larly on-the-ground investigations."32 
1. Alternatives to Exit
In broad terms, the OTP has three options through which
to align workload with resources. The Prosecutor could decide 
not to enter new situations, to enter new situations by rede­
ploying staff assigned to existing situations, or to open new sit­
uations by exiting existing ones. 
a. No Entry into New Situations
The Rome Statute establishes three ways in which the
OTP can acquire new situations to investigate. A situation can 
be referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party or by the U.N. 
Security Council, or the Prosecutor can initiate an investiga­
tion proprio motu.33 Thus, although the Prosecutor can decide 
not to initiate any new investigations on her own initiative, 
State Parties and the U.N. Security Council can continue to 
request that she investigate the situations that they refer.34 active in eight situations and had a budget of 28.3 million Euros. 2 lNT'L CRIMINAL COURT, AsSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT, OFFICIAL RECORDS, ICC-ASP/12/20, supra note ,9, at 12. 31. The difficulties the OTP is experiencing with current resource con­straints are documented in its most recent strategic plan. See Int'l Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 'll 17 (Oct. 11, 2013), available at http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of% 20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/policies%20and%20 strategies/Documents/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2012-2015.pdf ("The rotational model that was used to meet the staffing demand for the Office's investiga­tions and prosecutions has surpassed its limits."). 32. Lilian Ochieng, International Criminal Court Secures Budget Increase,DAILY NATION Qan. 17, 2014), http://mobile.nation.eo.ke/news/Intema­tional-Criminal-Court-Budget-Increase/-/1950946/2150244/-/fonnat/ xh tml/ -/ hieOpOz/ -/ index.html. 33. Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 13-15.34. Article 53(3) (a) does permit the state (or the U.N. Security Council)that made the referral to ask the Pre-Trial Chamber to review a decision by 
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Despite their ability to make continued requests, neither a 
state nor the U.N. Security Council can force the Prosecutor to 
open an investigation. Indeed, the Prosecutor's discretion not 
to open investigations into situations that political actors have 
referred to the Court35 (and to open investigations into situa­
tions that political actors have not referred to the Court) 36 is 
one of the factors that distinguishes the ICC from the ad hoc 
tribunals.37 Nonetheless, the ICC Prosecutor's discretion not 
to open an investigation into a situation that has been referred 
to the Court is not unfettered.38 For both legal and political 
reasons, it is difficult to imagine the Prosecutor repeatedly de­
clining to open investigations into statutorily viable situations 
referred to the Court. 
The Rome Statute establishes the factors that the Prosecu­
tor must consider in deciding whether to open an investiga­
tion. The Statute presumes that the Prosecutor "shall" initiate 
an investigation, provided there is a reasonable basis to believe 
a crime within the Court's jurisdiction has been committed 
and the case is admissible in terms of complementarity. 39 As­
suming these grounds are met, the only basis left for the Prose­
cutor to decline the investigation is if "[t]aking into account 
the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice."40 
The current policy of the OTP establishes a strong pre­
sumption in favor of prosecution, noting that a decision not to 
prosecute in the interests of justice would be "highly excep-
the Prosecutor not to open an investigation ( or not to prosecute after having 
opened an investigation). Id. art. 53(3)(a). The Pre-Trial Chamber may also 
request that the Prosecutor review his or her decision. However, there is no 
basis for legal sanction should the Prosecutor maintain the decision not to 
open an investigation. 
35. Id. art. 53.
36. Id. art. 15.
37. Goldstone & Fritz, supra note 14; Schabas, supra note 14.
38. Likewise, the Prosecutor's discretion to open an investigation into a
situation that has not been referred to her is not unfettered. As per article 15 
of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must receive authorization from the 
Pre-Trial Chamber for a profrrio motu investigation to proceed. Rome Statute, 
supra note 11. 
39. Id. art. 53(1 ). 
40. Id. art. 53(l)(c).
18 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 tional."41 But because the Prosecutor has never invoked thisprovision, it remains unclear what, in concrete terms, such "highly exceptional" circumstances might be. What is clear is that if the Prosecutor decided not to enter a new situation solely on the basis of "interests of justice" considerations, she would have to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber, which would then have the right to review the decision.42 If the judges de­cided to review, then her decision not to enter a new situation could be maintained only with the Pre-Trial Chamber's confir­mation.43The Prosecutor could also try to make the case that, as a consequence of resource constraints, it would not be in the interests of justice to enter a new situation. An argument might be that properly staffing a new situation would mean diverting resources from existing prosecutions, which in tum would generate delays significant enough to violate the inter­nationally recognized human rights standards incorporated under article 21 ( 3) of the Rome Statute. 44 But it would be upto the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide whether resource con­straints satisfied the interests-of :iustice exception to the pre­sumption in favor of entering a situation that in all other re­spects met the statutory requirements. In addition to this significant legal hurdle, the Prosecutor would likely have political difficulty maintaining a decision not to enter any new situations until additional funds were allo­cated. Presumably, whenever a political actor-a state or the 
41. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Prelim­
inary Examinations 17 (Nov. 2013), availabl,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_ 
menus/ice/ press%20and %20media/press%20releases/Documents/ OTP% 
20Preliminary%20Examinations/OTP%20-%20Policy%20Paper%20Prelimi 
nary% 20Examinations % 20%202013. pdf. 
42. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(3) (b).
43. Id. The scenario of the Pre-Trial Chamber overriding the Prosecu­
tor's decision not to open an investigation has not yet arisen at the ICC. 
However, in such an instance, one could imagine that the Prosecutor, while 
formally instructed to open an investigation by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
would have a number of informal options at her disposal, from general bu­
reaucratic delay to the avoidance of investigative inquiries likely to lead to 
the hardest cases, through which to demonstrate formal compliance while 
avoiding a genuinely thorough investigation. 
44. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(c),
Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (enumerating the right to be tried without 
undue delay). 
2014) THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 19 U.N. Security Council-refers a situation to the Court, it typi­cally has a strong interest in seeing the Prosecutor open an investigation, and would complain loudly about a decision not to do so.45 In and of itself, this would not necessarily be a significant problem for the Prosecutor; indeed, she should expect states to express dissatisfaction with her decisionmaking any time they believe their interests are not being served by the ICC. Yet, if the Prosecutor cited resource constraints as the grounds for refusing to enter new situations on a repeated basis, this would inevitably cause conflict between the Prosecutor and the Court's legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), which is made up of states that have joined the ICC and is responsible for financing the Court's work.46 
45. Of course, one can also imagine a scenario in which a state, unwilling
to intervene in a conflict situation itself, views a referral to the ICC as a way 
of outsourcing the problem while appearing to be "doing something" to ad­
dress the situation. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. ScHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNA­
TIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT 232 (2008) (noting that, with respect to the U.N. 
Security Council's referral of Darfur to the ICC, "the international commu­
nity showed little willingness to take more vigorous action .. . and assign­
ment to the Court could be seen as a fig leaf for inaction"). 
46. The formation of the ASP arises from article 112 of the Rome Stat­
ute. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 112. The relationship between the ASP 
and the organs of the Court, including the OTP, has not been without ten­
sion. For instance, the OTP submitted objections to the ASP's proposal to 
form an Independent Oversight Mechanism that would have proprio motu 
power to investigate any OTP staff without the Prosecutor's permission. The 
Prosecutor argued that this would encroach on the independence of the 
OTP. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Legal Memorandum on 
the IOM Mandate (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://iccforum.com/media/ 
background/lectures/ ask-former-prosecutor /2010-11-19_ OTP _Memo ran 
dum_on_lOM_Mandate_(English).pdf. The ASP ultimately decided to es­
tablish the oversight mechanism despite the Prosecutor's objection. Int'! 
Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on the In­
dependent Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/9/31 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ ASP9/ICC-ASP-9-31-ENG.pdf. 
The ASP referred to article 112(4) of the Rome Statute, which enables the 
ASP to establish subsidiary bodies, "including an independent oversight 
mechanism for inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court, in or­
der to enhance its efficiency and economy." Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 
112(4). On the relationship between the Prosecutor and the ASP, see gener­
ally David Donat-Cattin, Decision-Making in the International Criminal Court: Functions of the Assembly of States Parties and Independence of the Court's Judicial Organs, in 2 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
CouRT 69-83 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 2004). 
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On the positive side, such tensions could lead the ASP to 
increase its funding, thus enabling the OTP to take on new 
situations without any trade-off in its staffing. But such a dis­
pute could also go in the opposite direction.47 In addition, 
there are informal accountability checks on the Prosecutor 
through non-signatory states and especially through NGOs.48 
The latter in particular are likely to object to a Prosecutor who 
repeatedly refuses to enter new situations.49 
In sum, even if the Prosecutor could satisfy the judges of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber that resource constraints meant that it 
would not serve the interests of justice to open a new investiga­
tion, it would be difficult to sustain repeated refusals to open 
investigations without incurring the wrath of both state and 
non-state actors who could credibly argue that such an ap­
proach cuts against the ICC's mandate of ending impunity. 
b. Entry into New Situations by Redeploying Staff from ExistingSituations
A second approach, used by the OTP until 2012, is to re­
deploy staff from existing situations without exiting those situ­
ations. This policy, described by the OTP as "the flexible use of 
resources through expanding or reducing joint teams in accor­
dance with needs," sounds sensible enough on paper.50 But in 
47. Both the ASP and the Prosecutor understand that the Rome Statute
permits the ASP, by majority, to remove the Prosecutor from office if he or 
she is "unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute." Rome Stat­
ute, supra note 11, art. 46(1) (b). It would be perverse, to say the least, for 
any member of the ASP to try to have the Prosecutor removed for failure to 
enter new situations due to a lack of funding by the ASP. Nonetheless, the 
existence of this provision impacts the power dynamics in the relationship 
between the Prosecutor and the ASP. 
48. See generally Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Ac­countability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. 
INT'L LAw 510, 525-34 (2003). 
49. While one might foresee some NGOs raising their concerns directly
to the ASP and pushing it to disburse more funds, the NGO community is 
not a monolith. If new investigations were repeatedly demanded, and de­
nied, in relation to a specific geographic region-Latin America, for in­
stance-then it seems reasonable to imagine that Latin American NGOs in 
favor of investigations would not hesitate to challenge the Prosecutor for 
prioritizing existing situations in Africa over new situations in Latin America. 
50. Int') Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Budget for
2012, ICC-ASP/10/10, ,r 94 Uuly 21, 2011), availab/,e at http://www.icc­
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASPlO/ICC-ASP-lO-lO-ENG.pdf. 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 21 practice, the approach has harmed the credibility of the Court. As the number of situations the Court enters has in­creased, redeployed staff members have been spread increas­ingly thin. This seems to have had a detrimental impact on the staff themselves. In a 2008 letter of concern to the Prosecutor, Human Rights Watch noted that "many investigators exper­ienced 'burn out' because there were simply not enough of them to handle the rigorous demands for conducting investi­gations."51 The transfer of experienced investigators from a sit­uation further exacerbates the problem of limited resources, as even if new staff are hired, it takes time to build their knowl­edge of the situation under investigation. In part as a means of counterbalancing these staff shortages, the OTP has undertaken labor-saving measures, such as relying on secondary sources of information in lieu of first-hand investigations.52 This has discredited the Court's in­vestigations in the eyes of at least some victims. For example, in the case against the Deputy President of Kenya, William Ruto, victims and witnesses made a submission to the Pre-Trial Chamber expressing their concern that the Prosecutor had not conducted a "meaningful" investigation into their exper­iences.53 According to victims, not only had they not been in­terviewed by the OTP, but they also did not know of anyone in their area who had been, nor had they heard of the OTP's having conducted investigations in their region at all.54By late 2012, the OTP publicly acknowledged the difficul­ties the redeployment model was generating. According to the OTP's 2012-2015 Strategic Plan, "[t]he rotational model that was used to meet the staffing demand for the Office's investi-
51. Human Rights Watch, Letter to the OTP (Sept. 15, 2008), availabl,e at
http:/ /www.article42-3.org/Secret%20Human %20Rights %20Watch %20Let 
ter.pdf. 
52. See generally AM. UNIV. WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 10. 
53. Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Re­
quest by the Victims' Representative for Authorization to Make a Further 
Written Submission on the Views and Concerns of Victims, ,r 10 (Nov. 9, 
2011), http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ doc/ docl264964.pdf ("Some of the 
victims felt that the failure of the OTP to conduct on-site investigations or to 
interview victims could explain why the case as presented by the Prosecution 
did not fully accord with the victims' own personal experiences."). 
54. Id.
22 INI'ERNATIONAL LAW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 gations and prosecutions has surpassed its limits. Current staff­ing levels are insufficient to meet all the demands."55 
c. Exiting Existing SituationsFor the Prosecutor to refuse to enter new situations untiladditional funding is provided would entail significant legal and political challenges. Yet, as the OTP itself now seems to recognize, the potential damage to the Court's reputation also makes redeploying staff from existing situations a fraught path to pursue. Under these circumstances, there are two remaining op­tions for addressing the problem of resource constraints. The first would be the possibility of the ASP significantly increasing the Court's resources such that it could appropriately staff every situation. This seems unlikely in practice.56 The second would be for the Court to exit some situations in order to enter new ones. While either of these approaches would ad­dress the Court's resource constraints, only the latter ad­dresses the moral hazard that arises when the Court stays, on an essentially permanent basis, in the situations it enters. In order to address the complementarity imperative, the Court must be transparent about the need to consider exiting ex­isting situations in order to enter new ones. Putting this final approach into practice, however, is not without its own compli­cations. II. THE EXIT PROBLEMOnce the necessity for the ICC to start considering exit has been established, the next question is how it might go about doing this. The immediately apparent problem, how-
55. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 
2012-2015, supra note 31, at 12. 
56. This would start to become a more realistic possibility if the U.N. 
Security Council began to provide funding for the referrals it makes to the 
ICC. However, this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. Quite 
apart from the opposition of Russia and China to the Court, the United 
States is prohibited under its own domestic law from providing financial sup­
port to the Court. See American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, 22 
U.S.C. § 7423(e) (2008) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
agency or entity of the United States Government or of any State or local 
government, including any court, may provide support to the International 
Criminal Court."). 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 23 ever, is that the Rome Statute provides no explicit guidance on this question. As a result, the Court is left to develop its own answers to such basic questions as which branch of the Court should make the decision, as well as when and how to exit. A. "Who Decides?In the absence of direct guidance from the Rome Statute, the three obvious contenders for decisionmaker are the Prose­cutor, the judges, and the ASP. Of these options, the Prosecu­tor would seem to have the greatest institutional competence for the task. The states of the ASP are not involved with any of the Court's situations in a granular way. And, although the judges gain detailed knowledge of any given situation through the cases that are presented to them, they cannot be expected to have the same awareness as the Prosecutor of the range of possible future cases in a situation. Article 42 of the Rome Statute provides for an indepen­dent Prosecutor with "full authority" over the staff and re­sources of the OTP57 and responsibility for conducting investi­gations and prosecutions. 58 While the Rome Statute says noth­ing explicit about exiting situations, the principle of complementarity advanced in the Statute, not to mention the finite resources of the Court, means that states could not have intended for the ICC to stay permanently involved in every sit­uation it entered. As a result, the Prosecutor's discretion to exit can be implied through the authority that states have dele­gated under the Statute. This reading of the Statute makes most sense in terms of the comparative institutional competen­cies involved. However, placing the exit decision in the hands of the Prosecutor would not necessarily mean excluding the judges or the ASP altogether. One could consider, for in­stance, bolstering the legitimacy of the Prosecutor's exit deci­sions by way of judicial review, for which there may already be a statutory mechanism. The Rome Statute clearly gives the Pre-Trial Chamber au­thority to review the Prosecutor's decision not to open a new investigation when that decision is taken in the interests of jus­tice. 59 And if, after an investigation, the Prosecutor decides 57. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 42(2).58. Id. art. 42(1).59. Id. art. 53(3)(b).
24 JNTJ,,J?NATIONAL LAW AND POJJ77CS [Vol. 47:I not to prosecute, again "in the interests of justice," the Cham­ber can review that decision as well. 6° From the face of the text, one could argue that the Chamber has the authority to exercise this latter power of review for new cases in situations where prosecutions have already been undertaken. But the text could equally be construed as limiting this review power to the first prosecution in a new situation. And, unfortunately, the drafting history of the Statute fails to clarify whether the Chamber's power only applies to situations in which the Prose­cutor decides not to pursue any prosecutions in the first place, or also includes situations where prosecutions underway are now being brought to a close.61 Assigning exit decisionmaking to the judiciary, however, may bring its own risks. The Rome Statute assigns the judges a solely judicial role, and the adjudication of a case is distinct from the political and logistical considerations that will almost inevitably be involved in an exit decision. In the words of IC1Y Judge Patricia Wald, in her partial dissent from a case on ap­peal in which the majority decided to end proceedings on the grounds of judicial economy, [It] is the job of the Prosecutor who must calibrate legal and policy considerations in making her choices on how to utilize limited resources. To recognize a parallel power in judges to accept or reject cases on extra-legal grounds invites challenges to their impar­tiality as exclusively definers and interpreters of the law.62 
60. Id.
61. See Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Articl,e 53, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' 
NoTEs ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1073 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008). Based on 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II to convene a status conference to in­
quire whether the Prosecutor had decided to close the Uganda investigation 
after five warrants of arrest had already been issued, it would seem that those 
judges at least believe that article 53(3) (b) grants them the authority to re­
view the Prosecutor's decision not to pursue further prosecutions even after 
the prosecution phase is underway. Situation in Uganda, No. ICGOI/04-01/ 
05-68, Decision to Convene a Status Conference on the Situation in Uganda
in Relation to the Application of Article 53, ,r 13 (Dec. 2, 2005). The record
of the status conference itself has not been made public.
62. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgment, Partial
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wald, 1[1[ 4, 14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For­
mer Yugoslavia July 5, 2001). 
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Nonetheless, Wald's views on this may be a particular product 
of her background and training in the U.S. domestic legal sys­
tem. In civil law systems, the prosecutor's discretion is compar­
atively limited, and in instances where the prosecutor is given 
more latitude,judicial oversight may be seen as appropriate.63 
Overall, in light of the substantial challenges facing the OTP 
as it develops a framework for exit decisionmaking, it does 
seem advisable for it to pursue a position that accepts a Pre­
Trial Chamber review of its exit decisions as a component of a 
strategy for safeguarding the legitimacy of such decisions. 
With respect to the ASP, the Rome Statute assigns it "man­
agement oversight" of the Court's administration,64 and to the 
extent the decision to exit falls within the administration of 
the Court, the ASP could provide another procedural check 
on the Prosecutor's discretion. However, the experience of the 
ad hoc tribunals highlights the risks involved in handing exit 
decisions to the ASP. The states of the ASP fund the Court, 
just as the states of the United Nations fund the ad hoc tribu­
nals. Leaving exit decisions to these funders, as has been the 
case with both the IC1Y and ICTR, risks a situation where exit 
is driven primarily by financial considerations, rather than by 
the justice needs of the situation.65 63. This is the situation in France, for instance, where an investigatingjudge, rather than the prosecutor, orders an indictment upon finding that the facts in the case constitute a crime. C. PR. PEN. art. 181 (Fr.) cited in Margaret M. deGuzman & William A. Schabas, Initiation of Investigations and 
Sel,ection of Case, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RuLES 161 (Goran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013). 64. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 112(2) (b).65. See, e.g., Cecil Aptil, Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda: Compl,etion Strategy and Residual Issues, 14 NEw ENG. J. lNT'L & Co MP. L. 169, 169-70 (2008) (describing how the financial concerns of statefunders generated "pressure on the officials of these international tribunalsto complete their work"); Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Compl,e­
tion Strategy: Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3J. lNT'L CRIM. JusT. 82, 95 (2005) ("The IC1Y Completion Strategy was, tosome extent, born from the ongoing debate about the cost-efficiency of itsactivities."); Daryl A. Mundis, The judicial Effects of the "Compl£tion Strategies" on
the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. lNT'L L. 142, 157-58(2005) (decrying the detrimental impact of a date-driven completion strat­egy on due process at the ad hoc tribunals). But see Larry D.Johnson, Closing
an International Criminal Tribunal Whil,e Maintaining International Human
Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity, 99 AM.J. INT'L L. 158, 160-61 (2005)
26 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 Assuming the interpretation advanced in this Article is correct, and that the Prosecutor is responsible for exit deci­sions, then even if the judges and/ or ASP provide oversight, the discretionary power in the hands of the Prosecutor is sig­nificant. But this would not be the first time the Prosecutor has dealt with high-stakes discretionary decisions. 1. Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICCThe birth of the ICC spurred a body of scholarship on how the first Prosecutor should use his discretion to determine what situations to investigate and which cases to prosecute-in other words, decisions of entry. Given the centrality of prosecutorial discretion to the question of exit, it is worth re­viewing this literature in order to extract any lessons on discre­tionary decisionmaking by the Prosecutor that should be con­sidered when developing a framework for discretionary deci­sionmaking with respect to exit. But first, a few caveats. In many respects, exit presents the flipside of the issues regarding entry that the first wave of literature on prosecutorial discretion engaged with. Like the choice of which situation to enter, exit decisions impact the Court's le­gitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders. And like entry, exit decisions also reflect the decisionmakers' view of the goals of the original intervention. But the expressive function of entry and exit are different. With respect to victims, for instance, the entry of the ICC into a situation signals that they have faced some of the most serious crimes of concern to humanity and that, although their government is not in a position to account for them, the ICC will. But exit will not necessarily express the opposite. Given the scale of crimes in the situations where the ICC is currently involved, and the debilitated state of the do­mestic judiciary in most of those situations, the ICC's exit may not mean that all of the worst crimes have been accounted for, or that a victim's own government is now able to prosecute any outstanding cases. 66 (arguing that Mundis overestimated the negative impact of the completion strategy on due process). 66. Moreover, in practical terms, exit raises new issues, including how toaccount for residual functions, like the oversight of post-conviction deten­tion, and legacy issues, such as the archiving of trial material. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, LEUVEN CENTRE FOR GLOBAL STUDIES, COMPLETION STRATEGIES 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 27 Exit will not typically be the mere mirror of entry from a statutory perspective either. The Rome Statute ensures that the Court only enters a situation when the relevant domestic justice system is unable or unwilling to conduct its own prose­cutions. 67 But given both the current state of the domestic sys­tems in many of the situations in which the Court operates, and the resource and cooperation constraints facing the Court, exit may need to be undertaken before the relevant do­mestic system becomes willing and able to prosecute. With these caveats in mind, the existing literature on dis­cretionary decisionmaking can provide useful insights to guide the Prosecutor's decisionmaking regarding exit. a. Legitimating Discretionary Decisions Through Good ProcessOne of the first, and still most widely cited, pieces onprosecutorial discretion at the ICC was written by Allison Mar­ston Danner. 68 The Article opens by comparing the ICC Prose­cutor's discretion to that of his counterparts at the ICTY and ICTR, finding that, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC "vests the power to investigate and prosecute the politically sensitive crimes within its broad territorial sweep in a single individual, its independent Prosecutor."69 Danner emphasized the reality that the ICC relies entirely on states for the enforcement of its decisions.70 She arguedthat the way to counterbalance this structural weakness was for the Prosecutor to build the legitimacy of the Court, and that the Prosecutor's discretionary powers should be put in service of this goal. 71 Acknowledging that democratic elections, the usual basis for legitimacy in a liberal domestic setting, were unavailable to the ICC, and that scholars had developed other bases of legiti­macy for international institutions, Danner nonetheless de­clined to offer "an alternative comprehensive theory of legiti-
(2009), available at http:/ /www.ipp.ghum.kuleuven.be/publications/heller 
.pdf. 
67. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17.
68. Danner, supra note 48.
69. Id. at 510.
70. Id. at 535.
71. Id. ("In order to cope with the weaknesses of the ICC's enforcement
regime . . .  the Prosecutor must seek to enhance the Court's legitimacy."). 
28 INTERNA 710NAL LAW AND POIJ11CS [Vol. 47:1 macy"72 that might be applicable to a treaty-based Court with multiple constituencies. Instead, she drew on Abram and An­tonia Chayes' account of legitimacy as applied to norms of in­ternational law. 73 The result was a focus on good process, char­acterized by principled, reasoned, and impartial decisionmak­ing, which Danner argued would be facilitated by the publication of criteria to guide prosecutorial discretion, akin to what is done in many domestic jurisdictions. 74 This focus on good process permeated much of the first wave ofliterature.75 And, at least initially, a consensus seemed to have emerged around Danner's argument that the Prosecu­tor could build legitimacy by fostering good process through the formulation and public promulgation of ex ante criteria to guide what situations to enter and which cases to prosecute.76 
72. Id.
73. See ABRAM CHAVES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAVES, THE NEw SoVER­
EIGNTI: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 127-34 
(1995) (describing legitimacy as demanding a "fair and accepted procedure" 
that is applied equally and satisfies basic minimum standards of "fairness and 
equity"). 
74. Danner, supra note 48, at 537-38.
75. See, e.g., Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before Na­
tional Courts and International Tribunals, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 124, 142 (2005) 
(arguing that enhanced transparency shields prosecutorial decisionmaking 
from error and abuse); Brian Lepard, How Should the ICC Prosecutor Exercise 
His OT Her Discretion? The Role of Fundamental Ethical Principles, 43 J. MARsHALL 
L. REv. 553, 558-62 (2010) (arguing for the role of key ethical principles in
the use of prosecutorial discretion); David Lu ban, Fairness to Rightness: Juris­
diction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOS­
OPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 569, 579 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas
eds., 2010) (arguing that the legitimacy of international tribunals comes
"from the manifested fairness of their procedures and punishments").
76. See, e.g., AVRIL McDONALD & RoELOF HAVEMAN, PROSECUTORIAL Dis.
CRETION-SOME THOUGHTS ON "OBJECTIFYING" THE EXERCISE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BY THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC 2-3 (2003), 
available at http:/ /www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/McDonald-Haveman_is 
sues_relevant.pdf ("It seems to be of vital importance that guidelines are 
developed - and made public - giving direction to the decision either [sic] 
or not to initiate an investigation."); Hector Olasolo, The Prosecutor of the ICC 
Before the Initiation of Investigations: A QuasiJudicial OT a Political Body?, 3 INT'L 
CRIM. L. REv. 87, 143 (2003) (arguing for a set of "precise and binding" 
criteria for prosecutorial discretion to be introduced into the ICC's Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure); Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor's Discretion Not 
to Proceed in the "Interests of Justice", 50 CRIM. L.Q. 305, 324 (2005) (arguing in 
favor of ex ante criteria to guide prosecutorial discretion). 
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Such ex ante criteria are also something that the Prosecu­
tor could consider adopting with respect to exit. One could 
imagine the Prosecutor issuing a policy statement with a 
checklist of standards to guide her decisionmaking regarding 
exit. But as the following section demonstrates, the ex ante 
criteria approach has not senred the Court particularly well to 
date in terms of shielding the Prosecutor's discretionary deci­
sions from criticism. Of course, it is unrealistic to imagine that 
any discretionary decision of the Prosecutor would be met with 
uniform acceptance, given the high stakes of the issues and 
diversity of the stakeholders involved. But the degree to which 
the ex ante criteria approach has failed to serve as a bulwark 
against criticisms of the Court's legitimacy is nonetheless strik­
ing when compared to what the first wave of scholars on the 
topic expected, and many of the same failings of the ex ante 
criteria approach in relation to entry may apply equally to dis­
cretionary decisionmaking on exit. 
b. Ex Ante Criteria
The Court's first Prosecutor responded favorably to the 
policy prescriptions arising from the early scholarship recom­
mending the use of ex ante criteria to demonstrate principled 
entry decisionmaking, initially releasing a draft policy paper 
on his prosecutorial strategy77 and then circulating a set of cri­
teria to guide the OTP's selection of situations and cases.78 In 
practice, however, this ex ante criteria approach has not ful-
77. Int'! Criminal Court, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office
of the Prosecutor (2003), availab/,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ 
1 fa 7 c4c6-de5f-42b 7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6 / 143594/ 030905 _policy _paper. pdf. 
78. Int'I Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Criteria for Selection
of Situations and Cases 1-7 (2006) (unpublished policy paper) ( on file with 
author). This was followed, in 2007, by a public paper on criteria to be con­
sidered when exercising discretion not to enter a situation, and in 2010 by 
criteria on the opening of a preliminary investigation, which has recently 
been updated. See Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Draft Policy 
Paper on The Interests of Justice (2007), availab/,e at http:/ /icc-cpi.int/NR/ 
rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-432l-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPin 
terestsOijustice.pdf; lnt'I Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Draft Pol­
icy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (2010), availab/,e at http://www.icc­
cpi.int/NR/ rdonlyres/9FF1EAAI -41 C4-4A30-A202-l 74B18DA923C/2825 
15/OTP _Draftpolicypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101.pdf; lnt'I Crim­
inal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examina­
tions, supra note 41. 
30 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 47:1 filled its promise of protecting the Court's legitimacy. Instead, the Prosecutor's decisions over both what situations to enter and which cases to prosecute have been mired in controversy. The situation in Uganda is a case in point. The OTP opened its Uganda investigation in 2004, after the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, referred the situation to the Court. From the outset, the situation attracted controversy. Museveni's referral asked the OTP to investigate solely those crimes allegedly perpetrated by a rebel group in northern Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).79 The Prosecu­tor's December 2003 joint appearance with Museveni in London to announce that Uganda had given the ICC its first referral led human rights organizations to question the Prose­cutor's impartiality and fuelled concerns that the Court was being used by Museveni as a tool to persecute his opponents.80 Human rights advocates quickly pointed out that there were allegations of serious crimes committed by Museveni's govern­ment forces in northern Uganda as well.81 The Prosecutor's subsequent announcement of his deci­sion to open an investigation made clear that he did not in­tend to limit his investigation to only one party.82 However, 
79. Int'! Criminal Court, Press Release, President of Uganda Refers Situa­
tion Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, (Jan. 29, 
2004), availabl,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20 
media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/president%20of%20uganda%20re 
fers%20situation00%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20ar 
my%20_lra_ %20to%20the%20icc.aspx. 
80. Michael Atim & Marieke Wierde, Justice at Juba: International Obliga­
tions and Local Demands in Northern Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? JusTICE, 
PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 22 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
81. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Press Release, ICC: Investigate All
Sides in Uganda (Feb. 5, 2004), availabl,e at http://www.hnv.org/news/ 
2004/02/04/icc-investigate-all-sides-uganda ("Violations committed by the 
UPDF include extrajudicial killings, rape and sexual assault, forcible dis­
placement of over one million civilians, and the recruitment of children 
under the age of 15 into government militias."). 
82. Int'! Criminal Court, Press Release, Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into Northern Uganda (July 29, 
2004), availabl,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and 
% 20cases/ situations/ situation% 20icc% 200204/ press% 20releases/Pages/ 
prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20opens 
%20an %20investigation %20into%20nothern %20uganda.aspx. 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 31 the only arrest warrants to date have been issued for members of the LRA.83 According to the Prosecutor, while his office investigated allegations against all groups, arrest warrants were justified for the LRA first because their crimes were the gravest, and the OTP's ex ante criteria emphasized the need to prioritize the gravest crimes.84 However, the Prosecutor's persistent refrain that his office simply acted consistently with its previously an­nounced criteria has done little to quell the controversy.85In addition to being criticized for what situations the OTP has entered, the Prosecutor has also been attacked for the situ­ations the OTP has not entered. One such controversy was over the decision not to open an investigation into allegations of crimes committed by British soldiers in Iraq. Notwithstand­ing the Prosecutor's publicly circulated explanation, which emphasized the small number of victims and connected the decision to the ex ante OTP criterion of considering the num­ber of victims when assessing whether the statutory standard of 
83. Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Ar­
rest for Joseph Kony Quly 8, 2005); Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/ 
04-01/05-54, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti Quly 8, 2005); Situation in
Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-56, Warrant of Arrest for Okot
Odhiambo Quly 8, 2005); Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-
57, Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen Quly 8, 2005); Situation in
Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-55, Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya 
Quly 8, 2005).
84. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Statement to the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, 7 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/NR/ 
rdonlyres/9D70039E-4BEC-4F32-9D4A-CEA8B6799E37 /143836/LMO_2005 
1024_English.pdf ("[I]n Uganda, the criterion for selection of the first case 
was gravity . . . Our investigations indicated that the crimes committed by 
the LRA were of dramatically higher gravity ... we have continued to collect 
information on allegations concerning all other groups, to determine 
whether other crimes meet the stringent thresholds of the Statute and our policy are met.") (emphasis added). 
85. See, e.g., Matthew Happold, International Criminal Court and the Lord's
Resistance Anny, 8 MELB.J. INT'L LAw 160, 171-72 (2007) (noting with skepti­
cism the likelihood that warrants will ever be issued for members of the 
UPDF). 
32 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 47:1 gravity is met, 86 the decision opened the Prosecutor to charges of politicization.87 Prosecutorial decisions with respect to which cases to pur­sue have been even more contentious. Most recently, the pur­suit of cases against sitting heads of state in Sudan and Kenya have drawn attention to the Court's all-African docket and led the Chairperson of the African Union to claim that the Prose­cutor is "race-hunting" Africans.88 In response, the OTP has pointed to the ex ante criteria in its policy paper on the selec­tion of situations and cases, noting that "[£] actors such as geo­graphical or regional balance are not relevant criterion [sic] for a determination that a situation warrants investigation under the Statute."89 Nonetheless, in October 2013, the Afri­can Union held an emergency meeting to discuss whether it should withdraw en masse from what many African heads of state argue is a politicized court.90 Although blanket with­drawal did not proceed, the Kenyan parliament has voted to 86. Letter from the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC in Response to Commu­nications Received Concerning Iraq (Sept. 9, 2006), availabf.e at http://www .icc-cpi. in t/NR/ rdonlyres/F596D08D-D8 l 0-43A2-99 BB-B899 B9C5BCD2/ 277422/OTP _letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf ("The Office considers various factors in assessing gravity. A key consideration is the num­ber of victims of particularly serious crimes, such as willful killing or rape. The number of potential victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in this situation - 4 to 12 victims of willful killing and a limited num­ber of victims of inhuman treatment - was of a different order than the number of victims found in other situations under investigation or analysis by the Office."). 87. See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Sef.ec­tion at the International Criminal Court, 33 M1cH. J. INT'L L. 265, 298-99 (2012) (arguing that by refusing to pursue allegations of crimes committed by Brit­ish officials in Iraq, while opening a preliminary examination into allega­tions of crimes committed by North Korean soldiers, the Prosecutor "seems to be currying favor with powerful states"); William Schabas, Prosecutorial Dis­cretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 731, 742-43 (2008) (criticizing the decision not to open an investiga­tion in Iraq where British soldiers were alleged to have killed civilians). 88. Aislinn Laing, International Criminal Court Is "Hunting" Africans, TELE­GRAPH, (May 27, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africa andindianocean/ 10082819 /International-Criminal-Court-is-hunting-Afri cans.html (quoting AU Chairperson Hailemariam Desalegn). 89. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Prelim­inary Examinations, supra note 41, at 3. 90. Faith Karimi, African Union Accuses ICC of Bias, CNN (Oct. 12, 2013),http:/ /www.cnn.com/2013/l O / 12/world/africa/ ethiopia-au-icc-summit/. 
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leave the Court,91 and a draft U.N. Security Council resolution 
to suspend the ICC's cases against Kenyan President Uhuru 
Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, was only narrowly de­
feated. 92 
The views of many citizens in Africa differ from their lead­
ership, and there is strong support for ICC prosecutions 
among segments of both the Sudanese and Kenyan popula­
tions. 93 But the fact that so many states who initially joined the 
Court are now openly considering withdrawal indicates that re­
lying on ex ante criteria as the primary means of legitimating 
the Prosecutor's discretionary decisions has not been as suc­
cessful as scholars had initially hoped, giving pause to any sug­
gestion that the same model be used for exit decisionmaking. 
c. Beyond the Ex Ante Approach
While the trend within the first wave of literature was
strongly in favor of ex ante guidelines as a way to shield the 
Prosecutor from criticism about the way he used his discretion, 
a minority of scholars raised concerns about the approach. 
In a thoughtful 2007 paper, Alexander Greenawalt argued 
that the kinds of dilemmas that are subject to prosecutorial 
discretion at the ICC may be so politically complex and con­
text-specific as not to be amenable to ex ante legal standards at 
all.94 Moreover, he worried that the guidelines approach was 
tied "to a domestic administrative law model, which is rooted 
in a democratic legitimacy that the ICC inherently lacks."95 He 
proposed, instead, that in times of ongoing crisis or political 
transition, the Prosecutor defer to political actors about 
whether or not to pursue prosecutions, reasoning that they 
91. Edmund Blair, Kenya Parliament Votes to Withdraw from ICC, REUTERS
(Sept. 5, 2013), http:/ /www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-kenya-icc­
vote-idUSBRE9840PB20130905. 
92. Michelle Nichols, African Bid for Kenya Trials DejlfTTal Fails at U.N. Se­curity Counci� REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/ l l/l 5/uk-kenya-icc-un-idUKBRE9AE0S020131115. 
93. Robert Wanjala, Kenya Victims Relieved lry Refusal to Postpone ICC Cases,
Au.AFRICA (Nov. 18, 2013), http:/ /allafrica.com/stories/201311190492 
.html; Interviews with Darfurian refugees at the Oure Cassoni refugee camp 
(Aug. 2008) (on file with author). 
94. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics: Prosecutorial Discre­tion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 583, 654 
(2007). 
95. Id. at 656.
34 INI'ERNATIONAL I.AW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 would have more specialized knowledge of the political dy­namics involved.96 Of course, such a proposal is not without itsown problems, and as Greenawalt himself recognized, it would "come at a cost to the ideal of an independent Prosecutor vig­orously pursuing investigations in the face of political weak­ness. "97 Yet, if the alternative is for the Prosecutor to have todelve into what are essentially political decisions, then the out­sourcing of such decisions to political actors may, in fact, serve as the best means of protecting the institutional integrity of the ICC.98 Greenawalt's concerns about the political nature of dis­cretionary decisions of what situations to enter arguably apply with even more force to the question of exit. The Rome Stat­ute requires the Prosecutor elected by the ASP to be an indi­vidual "of high moral character [and] be highly competent in and have extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial of criminal cases."99 Meanwhile, a well-managed exit froma situation is likely to require a level of context-specific local knowledge and political judgment that may not be within the skill set of someone chosen for their prosecutorial experience. As a result, credible challenges to the Prosecutor's expertise for this task could well be raised. To insulate itself from these challenges, the OTP might consider consulting with those who have expertise the Prose­cutor lacks. Under the statutory interpretation advanced in this Article, the decision to exit would still need to be taken by the Prosecutor. But one could envisage the OTP establishing an Exit Guidance Committee for each situation, comprised of local representatives and country-area experts with more legiti­macy than the Prosecutor on the implications of ICC exit for the domestic justice system and local political dynamics. More recently, Margaret deGuzman has developed an al­ternative critique of ex ante criteria, arguing that "good pro­cess is not enough."100 In her view, any criteria will inevitablybe so indeterminate that the Prosecutor's claim that such stan­dards were the basis for selection decisions may, in fact, under-
96. Id. at 660-69.
97. Id. at 660.
98. Id.
99. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 42(3).
100. deGuzman, supra note 87, at 289.
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 35 mine the Court's legitimacy, instead generating suspicion that the Prosecutor's own preferences filled in the gaps in the crite­ria.101 For deGuzman, legitimacy will continue to be a problemfor the ICC unless the criteria used to make prosecutorial deci­sions are connected to goals and priorities that the Court's stakeholders accept.102With respect to exit, deGuzman's concern that good pro­cess will be insufficient as long as the ultimate goals of the Court remain contested presents a significant challenge. A lack of consensus around the goals of the ICC among and within the Court's various constituents means that there is un­likely to be agreement over what constitutes an appropriate basis for exit in the medium term. Some groups believe the goal of the ICC is prevention or retribution, while others be­lieve it is establishing an accurate historical record, reconcilia­tion, deterrence, or advancing the rule of law.103There is a large, and growing, body of scholarly work presenting normative arguments in favor of the various philo­sophical underpinnings of international criminal law.104 Be­tween these competing views there is an important question of whose voices should be amplified. If, as some contend, justice is to serve the victims of internationally recognized crimes, then their views must be taken into account. And yet, victims are no more a monolith than any other group of actors in this 
101. Id. at 296. deGuzman's concern about the inevitability of indetermi­
nate guidelines echoes Greenawalt, who worried that "[t]he kind of guide­
lines that provide for meaningful ex ante decisional rules likely to demon­
strate the ICC Prosecutor's impartiality may not be the kind likely to em­
brace the full complexity and contingency of each situation." Greenawalt, supra note 94, at 656. 
102. deGuzman, supra note 87, at 299.
103. See, e.g., MARK DRUMBL, ATROCI1Y, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAw 149-80 (2007) (discussing retribution, deterrence, and expressivism); 
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethink­ing the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HuM. RTs. Q. 573, 586 (2002) 
(discussing truth-telling, punishing perpetrators, promoting healing for vic­
tims, advancing the rule of law, and facilitating national reconciliation). 
104. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 87, at 298-99; Alexander Greenawalt, International Criminal Law for Retributivists, 35 U. PA. J. OF INT'L L. 101, 102 
(forthcoming 2014) (on file with author); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 (2007); An­
drew K. Woods, Moral judgments & International Crimes: TheDisutility of Desert, 
52 VA. j. INT'L L. 633 (2011). 
36 INFJ,,"'J?NAT/ONAL I.AW AND POU11CS [Vol. 47:1 realm.105 Which of competing victims' voices should be heard? If, on the other hand, advancing the rule of law is a core prior­ity, then perhaps legal professionals deserve more say. One way to navigate through these competing views is to consider the question from the perspective of accountability, a close cousin of legitimacy. Who among the Court's constitu­ents has the power to hold the Prosecutor accountable for her discretionary decisions? Traditionally, the power to hold deci­sionmakers accountable has rested with those who have dele­gated the authority, as the ASP has done with respect to the Prosecutor.106 Indeed, for some commentators, this formal, hi­erarchical relationship remains the only true form of account­ability.107 Given that the ASP is responsible for funding the Court, there is good reason for the Prosecutor to prefer its views.108 From a normative standpoint, one might object to thenotion that those with financial power have more influence than the victims in whose name the Prosecutor acts, and the experiences of the ad hoc tribunals' funder-driven completion strategies provide a sobering warning in this respect. Yet the views of the ASP cannot be discounted altogether, since with-
105. A comprehensive smvey of Darfuri refugees, for instance, found that
more than half believed there should be ethnically based collective responsi­
bility for the crimes committed against them, whereas one third believed 
that only the individuals who committed crimes should be held to account. 
Jonathan Loeb et al., Darfurian Voices: Documenting Darfurian Refugees' Views on Issues of Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, 24 HOURS FOR DARFUR, http:/ /static 
.squares pace .com/ static/ 52920ed5e4b04a07 41 daa89c/ t/ 529224ffe4b049dd 
Oca09a3f / 1385309439460 /Darfurian % 20Voices %20-% 20Report% 20-% 20 
English.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
106. See, e.g., Mark Pallis, The operation of UNHCR's Accountability Mecha­nisms, 37 N. Y.U. J. INT'L L. & Pot.. 869,870 (2006) (observing that the dele­
gation model of accountability is currently the most popular). 
107. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Adminis­trative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REv., 2073, 2075 (2005) (explaining that "true 
accountability . .. [involves] .. . hierarchy, monitoring, reporting, internal 
rules, investigations, and job evaluations"); but see Sabino Cassese, Administra­tive Law Without the State? The ChaUenge of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y. U.J. INT't. 
L. & Pot.. 663, 688 (2005) (arguing that a post-hierarchical mode of account­
ability is both possible and desirable in the international realm).
108. Of course, the ASP itself is not a monolith, and to the extent there
are divergent views, one might expect the perspectives of the largest donor 
countries, namely Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, 
to hold sway. 
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out funding, no one could be prosecuted, precluding success 
on any metric, regardless of viewpoint. 
This traditional analysis of accountability relations is, how­
ever, open to challenge. Descriptively speaking, Mark Bovens 
draws a useful distinction between "vertical" and "horizontal" 
accountability relationships, with only the former involving re­
lationships where the constituency has the formal power to im­
pose consequences on the authority concerned. 109 Under this 
framework, the Prosecutor is engaged in a vertical accountabil­
ity relationship with the ASP, but a horizontal relationship 
with the victims and witnesses of the situations she enters. The 
latter have no formal power to sanction the Prosecutor, but 
they can readily frustrate her work by refusing to cooperate 
with an investigation or, more indirectly, by generating nega­
tive publicity about the Prosecutor's investigative activities. 
Furthermore, although one might argue that once the OTP 
has exited a situation, those victims and witnesses lose that· 
power, this may be too simplistic a conclusion. 
As Julia Black points out, in the polycentric regulatory 
context, the accountability ecosystem involves an evolving set 
of interrelationships. 110 In an interconnected world, one
could imagine victims and witnesses in one situation reaching 
out in solidarity to poison or strengthen the Prosecutor's fu­
ture relationship with the victims and witnesses of the next sit­
uation the OTP enters. 
In sum, the underlying goals of the Court are contested 
and likely to remain so in the medium term, and the OTP ig­
nores any of the constituencies that can hold it accountable at 
its own peril. But waiting for an imagined future point at 
which there is broad consensus among the Court's constitu­
ents over the goals to be achieved before exit generates its own 
significant problems.111 Thus, it seems likely the OTP will 
need to start planning for exit, even in the face of this ongoing 
process of contestation. 
109. Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual
Framework, 13 EuR.j. L. 447,460 (2007). Nico Kirsch advances a normative 
defense of a pluralist, rather than hierarchical, framework of accountability, 
based on the deficits of a given constituency. Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of 
Global Administrative Law, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 247, 272-74 (2006). 
110. See generally Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Ac­
countability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GoVERNANCE 137 (2008). 
111. See supra Part I.
38 INFERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS B. When and How to Exit [Vol. 47:1 The lack of guidance from the Rome Statute compels the search for comparative experiences upon which the ICC can draw in developing its own process for exit decisionmaking. The ICTR's final appeal is scheduled for completion in 2015,112 and the IC1Y anticipates that its final trial will be held in 2016.113 Already, a residual mechanism is in operation tohandle the legacy issues of both tribunals, 114 and the exper­iences of these ad hoc tribunals as they wind down their opera­tions have generated a number of lessons from which the ICC could learn.115 However, because of the ICC's status as a per­manent institution, the considerations involved in the exit of the ICC from a situation differ from those of the ad hoc tribu­nals. Even for a temporary institution, the costs of a poor exit are high. As the IC1Y has found, when constituents feel an exit has been badly managed, it can color their perceptions of the intervention as a whole.116 But for a permanent institution like the ICC, the stakes are even higher, since a poor exit is likely to impact the ongoing credibility of the institution and its associated ability to undertake future interventions. 
112. President of the ICTR, &port on the Compktion Strategy of the Interna­tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ,r 18, U.N. Doc. S/2013/663 (Nov. 13, 
2013). 
113. Compktion Strategy, IC1Y, http:/ /www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited 
Sept. l, 2014). 
114. Mechanism for International Tribunals, IC1Y, http://www.icty.org/sid/ 
10874 (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
115. See, e.g., Heller, LEUVEN CENTRE FOR GLOBAL STUDIES, supra note 66, 
at 33-44; Fausto Pocar, Compktion or Continuation Strategy? Appraising Prob'-ems and Possibl,e Deuel,e,pments in Building the Legacy of the ICTY, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. 
JusT. 655 (2008) (arguing for completion to be viewed as a continual project 
that involves an effort to strengthen the rule of law in domestic settings). 
There are also more than twenty Completion Strategy Reports available on 
the IC1Y and ICTR websites. Reports and Publications, IC1Y, http:/ /www.icty 
.org/sections/ AbouttheIC1Y/ReportsandPublications (last visited Oct. 1, 
2014); !CTR Compktion StratefsY, ICTR, http:/ /www.unictr.org/ AboutICTR/ 
ICTRCompletionStrategy/tabid/118/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 
2014). 
116. See Giovanna M. Frisso, The Winding Down of the ICTY: The Impact of the Compktion Strategy and the Residual Mechanism on Victims, 3 GoETTINGEN J. 
INT'L L. 1093, 1120-21 (2011) (arguing that the IC1Y completion strategy 
instrumentalized victims, negatively affecting their perceptions of the legiti­
macy of the trials). 
2014) THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 39 U.N. peacekeeping operations have been struggling with these risks for decades. Of course, the goals of a peacekeeping intervention are different from an international judicial inter­vention, and the control the U.N. Security Council has over peacekeeping operations is more akin to the control the Council has over the ad hoc tribunals than to its relationship to the ICC.117 However, the analogy between peacekeeping exit and ICC exit is relevant in the sense that in both cases, exit from one situation must be undertaken while other situa­tions remain active, and with the knowledge that new situa­tions will need to be entered into in the future. For the ICC and the United Nations alike, there is a con­stant cost-benefit calculation in play, since the continuation of operations in one situation uses resources, both financial and political, that could be deployed in other current or future sit­uations. For the ICC, launching an investigation into a new situation is a resource-intensive activity; institutional knowl­edge of the new situation needs to be built from scratch. While the benefits of the first case in a new situation might be greater than the eighth case in an existing situation (the im­pact of a shift from total impunity to the start of accountability is presumably greater than the shift from start of accountabil­ity to further accountability), the costs will be greater, too. Also true for both the ICC and U.N. peacekeeping is that the reputational impact of a poor exit on current and future oper­ations is an ever-present risk. A report of the U.N. Secretary General, issued in 2001, is instructive. Reviewing exits from the U.N. peacekeeping oper­ations of the nineties, the report explains that while an unsuc­cessful intervention reflects badly on the legitimacy of peacekeeping as a tool in general, and that exit following the successful completion of a mandate is optimal, in reality exit must often be considered in circumstances of failure or, most commonly, partial success.118 
117. Although the Rome Statute gives the U.N. Security Council the
power to refer situations to the ICC, the ICC's relationship to the Council 
differs from the ad hoc tribunals in that the ICC was created by treaty, and 
not by the U.N. Security Council. As such, the ICC is not a U.N. body. 
118. U.N. Secretary General, No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Deci­sion-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Opera­tions, U.N. Doc. S/2001/394 (Apr. 21, 2001). 
40 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 47:1 While the ultimate goals of the ICC's activities are subject to ongoing contestation, 119 at least from a statutory perspec­tive the Preamble to the Rome Statute establishes the goal of an "end to impunity" for perpetrators of the most serious in­ternational crimes.120 Potential refinement of this sweepingmandate is discussed in Part III, but taking the preambular language at face value, it seems that the Court will inevitably need to exit situations where something less than an end to impunity has been achieved, since it deals with crimes that oc­cur on such a scale that the prosecution of all perpetrators will ordinarily be a financial and logistical impossibility. And, as the Secretary General's Report warns, "it is in the grey area between clear success and failure that a decision [ to exit] be­comes complex."121 As Richard Caplan notes with respect to U.N. peacekeep­ing operations, "[t]he reasons for partial success or failure are germane to the formulation of exit strategies."122 The samewould seem to be true for the ICC. For instance, the Court would need to consider its approach to exit differently in a situation where states have refused to execute the remainder of the Court's arrest warrants than in a situation where the OTP has failed to get arrest warrants in the first place because of a lack of access to the investigation site.123Reflections from U.N. peacekeeping operations also high­light the role that states play in determining the likely success of an exit strategy.124 This attention to actors beyond the con­trol of the international institution in question is similarly rele­vant to the ICC.Just as a U.N. peacekeeping operation cannot accomplish sustainable peace without financial and political support from states for transitional arrangements as peacekeepers exit, so too the ICC cannot hope to fulfill the 
119. See supra Part II.Al.iii.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl.
121. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 118, ,r 55.
122. Richard Caplan, Exit Strategi,es and State Building, in EXIT STRATEGIES
AND STATE Bun.DING, supra note 15, at 3, 8. 
123. See infra Part III.B.
124. See U. N. Secretary General, supra note 118, ,r 52 ("No matter how
carefully a mission is conceived and tailored to the circumstances, it cannot 
succeed .. . without the timely contribution and deployment of personnel, 
material and funds [by Member States]."). 
2014) THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 41 ideal of ending impunity unless the capacity of domestic jus­tice mechanisms is strengthened. Recognition of the ICC's dependency on states is nothing new. The Court's need for cooperation from states is clear from the Rome Statute, and the question of the relationship between the Court and domestic jurisdictions was one of the most discussed topics in the first decade of scholarship on the ICC.125 There are views along a spectrum as to whether the Prosecutor should be in a competitive or cooperative relation­ship with domesticjurisdictions. 126 And views differ as to how passive or active the OTP should be in its approach to comple­mentarity, with some maintaining that the OTP should stay at arm's length from domesticjurisdictions,127 while others argue that the OTP should "motivate and assist" national judiciar-
125. See, e.g., John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus theICC, in l THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT: A 
COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds. 2002) (analyzing the relation­
ship between the ICC and national courts); Burke-White, supra note 7 (argu­
ing for the Prosecutor to pursue a policy of "proactive complementarity" by 
encouraging and assisting domestic prosecutions); Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869 (2002) (providing a comprehensive history of 
the development of the principle of complementarity); Federica Gioia, State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and Modern International Law: The Principle of Comple­mentarity in the International Criminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1095 (2006) 
(arguing that complementarity is crucial to the realization of the goal of 
ending impunity for international crimes); Kevin]. Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Pro­cess, 17 CRIM. L. F. 255 (2006) (concerned that complementarity will expose 
defendants to national proceedings that lack due process); William A. 
Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L. F. 5 (2008) (arguing that the kind of cooperative relationship between the
ICC and a State that is present in instances of self-referral is inconsistent with
the underlying purpose of the Rome Statute); Carsten Stahn, Complementar­ity: A Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L. F. 87 (2008) (arguing that a cooperative
relationship between the ICC and a State is consistent with a "positive" read­
ing of complementarity, grounded in the Rome Statute).
126. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 125 (arguing that the kind of cooperative
relationship between the ICC and a State that is present in instances of self­
referral is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Rome Statute). Cf 
Stahn, supra note 125. 
127. See, e.g., Seils, supra note 3, at 1012 ("There are very good reasons for
the OTP not to be involved in anything to do with national prosecutions."). 
42 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 ies. 128 What is not in dispute is that, as with peacekeeping op­erations, states have a vital role to play in determining the suc­cess of the Court's activities. Finally, lessons from U.N. peacekeeping operations coun­sel that exit must be understood as a process, not a singular point.129 As with the kind of interventions undertaken by the ICC, realities on the ground are dynamic, and the decision of when to exit must be sufficiently flexible to take into account the impact of changing circumstances. One could imagine a scenario in which the ICC planned to exit on the basis of an assessment that domestic justice mechanisms were capable of prosecuting crimes in the situation, only to find months later that a military coup unraveled gains the domestic system had made.130 As a result, a successful exit strategy must be de­signed around benchmarks, such as whether the domestic jus­tice system is able to undertake prosecutions of outstanding cases, rather than on specific dates for withdrawal.131 
Ill. TOWARD A SOLUTION The core of the problem identified in this Article is that the ICC needs to start thinking about a plan for exiting ex­isting situations in the absence of any pre-existing guidance on how to go about doing so. Because the Court is a permanent institution, a poor exit decision has the potential to under­mine not only perceptions about the Court's work in the situa­tion it is leaving, but also perceptions of the Court as an insti­tution that is active in other situations, both now and in the future. Given the ICC's high level of dependency on the coop-
128. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 7, at 54 ("[T]he ICC could partici­
pate more directly in efforts to encourage national governments to prose­
cute international crimes themselves."). 
129. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 118; Dominik Zaum, Exit and In­ternational Administrations, in EXIT STRATEGIES AND STATE BUILDING, supra 
note 15, at 137, 144-45. 
130. The Rome Statute appears to account for such scenarios with respect 
to investigations that the Prosecutor has agreed to defer at the request of the 
State, with such a referral being open to review "any time when there has 
been a significant change of circumstances based on the State's unwilling­
ness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation." Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 18. 
131. See Caplan, supra note 122, at 10-11 (describing the problems with 
deadlines and benefits of a benchmark system for exit strategies). 
 
2014) THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 43 eration of external actors, these perceptions can affect the Court's ability to carry out its mandate. With such high stakes involved, both the procedural and substantive aspects of exit decisionmaking must be carefully developed. A. Defining Success for the Purpose of ExitAlthough the Rome Statute offers no explicit guidance on exit, it does provide several parameters within which the deci­sion must be taken. Combining these statutory parameters with the policies to which the OTP has committed itself over the past decade generates a working definition of success for the purposes of exit: The OTP will have succeeded when the main perpetrators of the main types of victimization across the gravest incidents in a situation have been prosecuted by the ICC, or will be prosecuted by domestic authorities in the fu­ture. In an ideal world, the ICC would only exit a situation after having achieved this goal. But as the experiences of U.N. peacekeeping operations indicate, this ideal will rarely be achieved.132 Before considering how scenarios of partial suc­cess or failure might impact exit decisionmaking, however, I first describe the statutory and policy provisions from which this Article's working definition of success emerges. 1. Statutory ParametersThe Rome Statute is clear that the ICC "shall be comple­mentary to national criminaljurisdictions."133 The majority of article 17 is dedicated to putting this principle into effect, and the ICC Appeals Chamber has provided clear guidance on how to assess whether the domestic prosecution of a particular case renders it inadmissible before the ICC.134 In an ideal, al-
132. See supra Part II.B.
133. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 1.
134. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against 
the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility 
of the Case, ,r 82 (Sept. 25, 2009) (confirming that the inadmissibility test 
involves two stages, the first of which is to establish if the case is being investi­
gated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it; only if the case is 
being investigated or prosecuted do the "unwilling or unable" tests need to 
be addressed). See al,so Darryl Robinson, The Inaction Controversy: Negkcted Words and New opportunities, in l THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND 
44 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 47:1 
beit unlikely, situation where all remaining cases were being 
pursued at the domestic level in a way that satisfied article 17 
guidelines, this would be an obvious situation for the ICC to 
exit. 
Beyond the issue of complementarity, article l 7(d) and 
article 21 (3) also give the Prosecutor guidance on when a par­
ticular prosecution must not be pursued. With regard to arti­
cle 17 ( d), which states that "the case is not of sufficient gravity 
to justify further action by the Court," the case law interpreting 
the article remains unsettled. In Lubanga, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
tried to establish a highly prescriptive interpretation of what 
constituted a sufficiently grave case to avoid an inadmissibility 
determination under article l 7(d), delineating criteria for the 
assessment of the gravity of both the alleged crime and respon­
sibility of the alleged perpetrator.135 However, this decision 
was overturned by the Appeals Chamber, which rejected the 
Trial Chamber's criteria and also found that the determina-COMPLEMENTARITI': FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 460 (explain­ing admissibility as a two-step test, and noting that commentators often over­look the first step of determining whether a state is investigating or prosecut­ing, or has investigated or prosecuted, a case). Cf Schabas, Prosecutorial Dis­
cretion v. judicial Activism, supra note 87, at 757 (accusing the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga of having "invented" the criterion of inactivity in its article 17 analysis). 135. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case Against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ,r 63 (Feb. 24, 2006) (requiring an affirmative answer to the following three questions: "(i) ls the conduct which is the ob­ject of a case systematic or large scale (due consideration should also be given to the social alarm caused to the international community by the rele­vant type of conduct)? (ii) Considering the position of the relevant person in the State entity, organisation or armed group to which he belongs, can it be considered that such person falls within the category of most senior lead­ers of the situation under investigation?; and (iii) Does the relevant person fall within the category of most senior leaders suspected of being most re­sponsible, considering (1) the role played by the relevant person through acts or omissions when the State entities, organizations or armed groups to which he belongs commit systematic or large-scale crimes within the jurisdic­tion of the Court, and (2) the role played by such State entities, organisa­tions or armed groups in the overall commission of crimes within the juris­diction of the Court in the relevant situation?"). 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 45 tion of the responsibility of an alleged perpetrator cannot be made on "excessively formulistic grounds."136 The Court has, however, suggested that the guidelines given by the Rules on Evidence and Procedure with respect to the determination of sentences might be relevant in a gravity analysis.137 This means that in considering whether a case can proceed under article 17 ( d), it is legally valid to consider "the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful be­havior and the means employed to execute the crime; the de­gree of participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and location; and the age, education, social and economic condition of the con­victed person."138 In the absence of any guidance as to how to weigh the various factors against each other, this list cannot provide any determinative assistance to the Prosecutor in deciding whether to exit a situation. But invoking these factors as part of an ex­planation of exit would at least be one means of bolstering the statutory legitimacy of any decision. For example, if all the re­maining cases in a situation involved crimes that caused lim­ited damage and were perpetrated by people who were elderly, the Prosecutor could turn to article 17 ( d) to help justify her decision to exit the situation. In practice, of course, such a sce­nario is unlikely. In most instances, the Prosecutor will be faced with remaining cases that are of equivalent severity to 
136. Situation in the DRC, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the
Prosecutor's Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled 
"Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58", 
,r 73 Quly 13, 2006) (criticizing the lower chamber's reasoning that the 
Court's deterrent effect would be strengthened by only prosecuting those in 
positions to issue orders and stating that it would be "more logical to assume 
tliat the deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no category of perpetrators 
is per se excluded from potentially being brought before the Court"). Id. ,r 
78 (finding tliat the Pre-Trial Chamber's proposed test was inconsistent with 
a contextual reading of the Statute as a whole-for instance, only prosecut­
ing those who issue orders would render superfluous the need for article 33 
of the Statute, which states that superior orders are no defense). 
137. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Carda, Case No. ICC-02/05-
02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ,r 31-33 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
138. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE
55 (2d ed., 2013) (Rule 145(1) (c)). 
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those previously prosecuted, thus rendering the list related to 
article 1 7 ( d) of little use. 
Article 21 (3) of the Statute directs the OTP's attention to 
the principle of impartiality and prevents the Prosecutor from 
pursuing a prosecution on account of the alleged perpetra­
tor's personal characteristics, such as gender, race, religion, or 
political affiliation.139 As such, the Prosecutor could turn to 
the Statute to help legitimate her decision to exit a situation by 
drawing on article 21 (3) in a scenario where the primary rea­
son for pursuing additional cases would be to demonstrate 
parity across ethnic lines. 
Any framework developed to guide decisions about what 
situations to exit should take the principles underlying articles 
17 and 21 (3) into account. However, these provisions alone 
are almost certainly under-determinative. One can readily im­
agine a scenario in which all of the OTP's existing situations 
involve current and future cases that continue to satisfy all of 
the statutory requirements, and yet a decision on exit must be 
taken. 
2. Policy Parameters
In terms of drawing on guidance the OTP has already de­
veloped, one goal seems clearly relevant: While "the [OTP] 
mandate does not include production of comprehensive his­
torical records for a given conflict, incidents are selected to 
139. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 21 (3). The principle of equality
before the law was, of course, established in core international human rights 
documents (and in many domestic jurisdictions) long before the Rome Stat­
ute was drafted. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 14, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966); Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (Dec. 10, 
1948). However, evidence from the ad hoc tribunals suggests that establish­
ing such a prohibited purpose on the part of the Prosecutor is not easy. For 
example, IC1Y judges found that a defendant seeking to challenge his in­
dictment on the grounds that the Prosecutor was discriminating on the basis 
of his religion would have to establish "an unlawful or improper (including 
discriminatory) motive for the prosecution" and "that other similarly situ­
ated persons were not prosecuted." The suspect could not meet the stan­
dard, and his challenge was rejected by the court. Prosecutor v. Delalic 
("Celebici case"), Case No. IT-96-21-A,Judgment, ,i 611 (Int'] Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 20, 2001). 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 47 provide a sample that is reflective of the gravest incidents and the main types of victimization."140 However, applying this "gravest incidents" prong is by no means simple. In addition to the ambiguity that already exists around the article l 7(d) gravity standard, how should the OTP think about similarly grave incidents that occur in different time periods or geographic locations?141 If, in its DRC investi­gation, the OTP had decided to exit after having prosecuted the gravest incidents in lturi but not in the Kivus, would its record have failed to provide a representative sample of the gravest incidents? What if, in its Darfur investigation, the OTP were to exit after having prosecuted the gravest incidents from 2004, but not from 2011? Less complicated is the "main types of victimization" prong, which would preclude exiting before prosecuting a par­ticular category of crimes, say gender-based violence, if such crimes were a central feature of the overall criminality. Relat­edly, the OTP might consider supplementing this prong to en­sure that the main types of perpetrators are also prosecuted before the OTP closes its investigation. The OTP policy that "parity within a situation between rival parties" is not relevant to the selection of cases142 is entirely appropriate and neces­sary to avoid article 21 (3) concerns that no one be prosecuted 
140. Int'l Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy
2009-2012, supra note 19, ,r 20. 
141. The jurisprudence of Rule llbis cases at the IC1Y is instructive in
terms of competing ways of viewing whether a "gravest incidents"-type stan­
dard has been met. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, 
Prosecution's Further Submissions Pursuant to Chamber's Order of 9 Febru­
ary 2005, ,r 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 21, 2005) 
(arguing that although crimes it alleged had been committed by Dragomir 
Milosevic were very grave, "they were already tried before the International 
Tribunal in [Galic] and are now well documented in that judgment"). The 
Court, however, denied the prosecution's request to send the Dragomir 
Milosevic case for prosecution at the domestic level, noting that although 
Rule 11 bis does not require it to consider the historical record, even if it did, 
the Court would decide that prosecution should continue at the interna­
tional level on the grounds that the crimes allegedly committed by Dragomir 
Milosevic covered a different time period from those committed by Galic. 
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1- PT, Decision on Referral of 
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ,r 20 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla­
via, July 8, 2005). 
142. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy
2009-2012, supra note 19, ,r 39. 
48 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 47:1 solely on account of party affiliation. But there is an important difference between a lack of parity and a distorted representa­tion of which types of actors committed serious crimes. 143 Con­cern for representing the main types of perpetrators before exiting a situation would preclude exiting the Uganda situa­tion, for instance, until some serious crimes committed by gov­ernment forces have been prosecuted. B. A Decisionmaking FrameworkBy pulling together the statutory prescriptions of articles 17(d) and 21(3), along with the guidelines that the OTP has already developed with respect to other forms of discretionary decisionmaking, we can see the working definition of success for the purposes of exit emerge: Success is when the main per­petrators of the main types of victimization across the gravest incidents in a situation have been prosecuted by the ICC, or will be prosecuted by domestic authorities in the future. To the extent this definition draws on goals the OTP has set for itself, which are far from settled in the eyes of the Court's various constituencies, it follows that the definition is open to contestation. Victims may be concerned that so-called "lesser" perpetrators-people that they witnessed killing their families, rather than those who issued orders from headquar­ters-will not be prosecuted before the ICC exits the situation. International lawyers and victims alike might disagree with the OTP's assessment of what constitutes the gravest incidents in a situation. But as the first scholarship on this issue, my goal here is not to establish a definitive metric of success, but in-
143. The situation in Rwanda illustrates this point. There is unquestiona­
ble parity between the crimes committed by the perpetrators of the 1994 
genocide and those committed by the RPF as it sought to stop them. Yet the 
RPF are alleged to have committed serious crimes, none of which have been 
prosecuted at the ICTR. As Human Rights Watch explains, "a failure also to 
address the RPF' s killing of tens of thousands of civilians will result in serious 
impunity for grave crimes committed in 1994 and would leave many with a 
sense of one-sided, or victor's, justice. Such a result would seriously under­
mine the Tribunal's legacy." Human Rights Watch, Letter to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Regarding the Prosecution of RPF Crimes (May 26, 2009), available at http:/ /www.hrw.org/node/83536. The 
Defence at the ICTR has also tried to push the Prosecution to investigate 
alleged RPF crimes, though with no success. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kabiligi, 
Case No. ICTR-97-34-1, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Supplementary 
Investigation, ,i,r 19-22 Qune 1, 2000). 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 49 stead to put forward a plausible option in the hope of spurring discussion among the Court's stakeholders about precisely what the metric should be. Combining this definition with the insights from peacekeeping operations that exit is best conceived of as a pro­cess guided by benchmarks, and that while exit following suc­cess is ideal, exit must also sometimes be considered in situa­tions of partial success or failure, yields a decision tree repre­sented in Graph 1. 
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50 INTERNATIONAL IA WAND POLITICS [Vol. 47:1 Under the proposed definition, success turns ultimately on prosecution, either by the ICC itself or by domestic authori­ties. But as shown in Graph 1, the exit decisionmaking process begins much earlier, and starts with the question of whether arrest warrants have been issued in accordance with the above criteria. If they have not been, the first question, represented on the left-hand side of the graph, is why. It could be that the OTP has been unable to gather enough evidence to make a full set of successful warrant appli­cations to the Pre-Trial Chamber because it is being barred from the investigation site, as is currently the scenario with its Sudan cases. If there is no prospect of cooperation from the situation state, this is a scenario in which the OTP might con­sider signaling its intention to exit the situation. This approach has the benefit of avoiding the trans­parency problems present in Uganda, where the situation re­mains formally open, but the OTP has not secured arrest war­rants for a representative sample of the crimes.144 Stakehold­ers have been left to speculate as to why no government forces have been charged, and allegations of bias by the OTP are common.145 The OTP could avoid ending up in such a situa-
144. See supra Part II.A.I. In drawing this comparison, I am not suggesting
that the reason for the one-sided pattern of warrants in the Uganda situation 
is a denial of access to investigative sites. My point is simply that the failure of 
the OTP to narrate a credible reason for a non-representative sample of war­
rants is problematic, and in a future scenario in which sample problems 
arise as the result of a non-cooperative domestic state, the OTP would be 
well advised to explain this publicly. 
145. See, e.g., Happold, supra note 85 (noting it is unlikely that warrants
will ever be issued for members of the UPDF). The official OTP summary of 
its first three years of operation maintained that while the first arrest war­
rants were for LRA members, analysis of alleged crimes by other groups was 
ongoing. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activi­
ties Performed During the First Three Years (June 2003-June 2006) (Sept. 
12, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB 
64-4 7 A9-9821-725747378AB2/l 43680/OTP _3yearreport20060914_English
.pdf. The OTP has not maintained the practice of issuing three-yearly up­
dates. But some, including the judges of the pretrial chamber, have ques­
tioned whether the investigation is actually ongoing. In 2005, the prosecutor
stated that the Uganda investigation was "nearing completion." Prosecutor v.
Joseph Kony, Case No. ICG02/04-0l/05-67, Registration in the Record of
Proceedings of Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Informal Meeting of Le­
gal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, New York, 24 October 2005, 1
(Dec. 2, 2005). Referring to this statement, Pre-Trial Chamber II convened a
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBI.EM 51 tion by instead communicating clearly the reasons it has not sought arrest warrants for a representative sample of the crimes committed, thereby ensuring the blame would be placed where it belongs, such as on an uncooperative situation state. Still, the outcome is the least satisfactory of all the exit possibilities explored in Graph 1, as it gives situation states seeking to avoid accountability an easy way out. Once the OTP exits under such circumstances, states will learn that they can avoid ICC action if they deny the OTP access to investigative sites for long enough that it eventually gives up. An alternative explanation could be that a representative sample of arrest warrants have not yet been issued simply be­cause investigations are ongoing. In such a scenario, the OTP could continue investigations through to completion or, if there is an indication that domestic authorities might be mov­ing toward a position of being both interested in and capable 
status conference, seeking to establish whether the Prosecutor had closed 
the Uganda investigation. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-
01/05-68, Decision to Convene a Status Conference in the Investigation in 
the Situation in Uganda Under Article 53 (Dec. 2, 2005). The subsequent 
status conference was non-public, but before the conference, the OTP 
lodged a public filing stating that it had not made a decision not to conduct 
further prosecutions. Prosecutor v.Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-
76, OTP Submission Providing Information on Status of the Investigation in 
Anticipation of the Status Conference to Be Held on 13 January 2006, ,r 2 
Qan. 11, 2006). The OTP also stated that regarding alleged crimes by the 
Ugandan government forces, its "inquiries and analysis of information and 
potential evidence related to these allegations are ongoing." Id. ,i 7. Since 
then, however, no new arrests have been made, and official OTP reports on 
the status of investigations have often excluded updates on investigations in 
Uganda. See, e.g., Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, Address to the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Par­
ties (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
CDF496C7-7BA 7-4AA3-B670-l EE85BC3E3E8/28 l 268/20091 l 18ASPspeech 
.pdf; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Address to the Assembly of States Parties (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ ASP9/Statements/ICC-ASP9-statements­
LuisMorenoOcampo-ENG.pdf (noting the need to present, or evaluate the 
need to present, new cases in existing investigations in Darfur and the Dem­
ocratic Republic of Congo, but making no mention of the possibility of new 
cases in Uganda). In the absence of either an acknowledgment by the OTP 
that it has effectively closed the Uganda situation or, if the situation remains 
open, an explanation as to why there have been no arrest warrants since 
those sought for LRA members in 2005, allegations of partisanship seem 
certain to continue. 
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of taking over investigations, the OTP could signal its future 
intention to exit in the hope of catalyzing the domestic system 
to action.146 
Turning to the right-hand side of the decision-tree, if ar­
rest warrants have been issued for a sample that reflects the 
OTP's goals, the next benchmark to consider is enforcement. 
If there has been foot-dragging by states over the enforcement 
of arrest warrants, the OTP might communicate that it will not 
wait for the enforcement of warrants indefinitely and that it is 
developing an exit strategy. One might argue that, much like 
exiting after being denied access to an investigative site, exit in 
the face of enforcement failure gives states seeking to avoid 
accountability an easy way out. But unlike access to investiga­
tive sites, warrant enforcement is not solely dependent on the 
situation state. Defendants travel, and when they do, there is 
an opportunity for other states, including those with much less 
interest in avoiding accountability than the situation state, to 
arrest them. There may be reluctance to incur the diplomatic 
costs of arresting the national of another state, but that is all 
the more reason to counter this reluctance with pressure for 
enforcement from the ICC. The threat of exit could build a 
sense of urgency that supports this goal. 
Once arrest warrants have been executed, the final bench­
mark relates to whether the ICC has completed the trials and 
appeals of all defendants. In the perhaps rare scenario where 
this is the case, the OTP can exit under the banner of success. 
Equally, if the domestic system becomes willing and able to 
take over the remaining cases, 147 the OTP would also be justi­
fied in exiting, again claiming success. 
In the more likely scenario, where domestic capacity is 
not yet strong enough to complete the investigation and prose­
cution of outstanding cases, the OTP could communicate its 
desire to exit in the hope of spurring not only the situation 
state, but also institutions and non-state actors in the interna­
tional community who could support the project of capacity 
building, to prepare the domestic justice system to take on the 
remaining cases. 
As discussed earlier, much scholarly attention has been 
devoted to the dependence of the ICC on states with respect to 146. See infra Part III.C.147. Infra Part III.C.
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the opening of situations and conduct of investigations. What 
should be clear from Graph 1 is that the ICC's dependence on 
states has significant implications for the question of exit as 
well. C. Exit as Opportunity
The assessment of when to exit a situation is complex 
enough in purely theoretical terms, let alone in practice. How­
ever, the Prosecutor must remember that although exit will 
bring substantial challenges, it can also be framed as a way of 
revitalizing the system of complementarity. 
In 2008, William Burke-White wrote that "the OTP's most 
powerful tool to encourage national prosecution is the threat 
of its own investigation, as such an investigation would likely 
impose significant sovereignty costs on the states affected."148 
In practice, genuine national prosecutions have not been 
spurred by the threat of ICC action, 149 and Burke-White's al­
ternative concern that the ICC might facilitate a "free-rider 
problem"150 has been the more characteristic outcome. In­
deed, a recent book-length treatment of the subject concludes 
that the literature's early expectation that the threat of ICC 
involvement would catalyze domestic proceedings has barely 
occurred at all.151 
In its preparation for the 2010 Rome Statute Review Con­
ference, the Bureau of Stocktaking on International Criminal 
Justice concluded that it was of "paramount importance that 
the complementary justice system of the Rome Statute is 148. Burke-White, supra note 7, at 86.149. NoUWEN, supra note 8.150. Burke-White, supra note 7, at 69. In more recent work, Burke-Whitehas recognized that the approach of "proactive complementarity" that heespoused in 2008 has not been adopted by the OTP, largely for fear of the perception that it would politicize the Court. Writing in 2011, he suggests that the OTP could reframe complementarity not as engaging in domestic politics, but as part of a screening function akin to what U.S. federal prose­cutors do in their relations with state criminal justice systems. William W. Burke-White, Re.framing Positive Compkmentarity: Reflections on the First Decade and Insights from the US Federal Criminal Justice System, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 360 (suggesting the ICC Prosecutor reconsider complementarity, "drawing on [gate-keeping and case selection functions within] the US fed­eral criminal justice system"). 151. NoUWEN, supra note 8.
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strengthened and sustained."152 More thought must be given 
to ways of increasing the incentives for national authorities to 
pursue accountability themselves, and the need to exit a situa­
tion presents a new opportunity to develop this thinking. 153 
The spurring of domestic prosecutions as a component of 
an exit strategy is one dimension in which lessons from the ad 
hoc tribunals may be relevant for the ICC. The primacy that 
the U.N. tribunals have over domestic jurisdictions places 
them in a different relationship to national courts than the 
ICC, but one example from the completion strategy of the ad 
hoc tribunals does seem particularly relevant to ICC exit, 
namely, the cooperation with domestic jurisdictions to com­
plete outstanding cases. 
Cases in which the ad hoc tribunals have already issued 
indictments are handed over to domestic prosecutors under 
Rule 11 bis, which sets the standards under which such a trans­
fer can occur. 154 Were the ICC to adopt a similar process, 
there would be a strong argument that once an ICC arrest war­
rant is issued, the Court has a responsibility to ensure that, 
regardless of where that defendant is actually prosecuted, he 
or she receives the same level of international rights protec­
tions he or she would have received at the ICC.155 This, in 
turn, would require additional Court resources in order to as­
sess domestic standards, and so may not bring huge efficiency 
gains over simply continuing to prosecute the cases directly. 
152. Int'! Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau 
on Stocktaking: Complementarity, Mar. 22-25, 2010, ,r 49, ICC-ASP/8/51 
(Mar. 18, 2010), available at http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ ASP 
SR/ICC-ASP-8-51-ENG.pdf. 
153. As one commentator warns, however, domestic prosecutions should 
be seen "as a problem in their own right, not a solution to the ICC's capacity 
constraints." Marlies Glasius, A Problem, Not a Solution: Complementarity in the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, in 2 THE INTERNA­
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARI'IY. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 1204. 
154. IC1Y, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. llbis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/
Rev.44 Quly 24, 2009) (providing guidelines for the transfer of cases from 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to domestic 
courts); !CTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. llbis(c), U.N. Doc. IT/ 
32/Rev.19 (Feb. 9, 2010). 
155. Once a defendant is brought to the ICC, he or she can rely on "inter­
nationally recognized human rights" standards to protect his or her rights. 
Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 21(3). 
 
2014] THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM 55 Nevertheless, such oversight is certainly possible, as it has been undertaken by both the IC1Y and ICTR in their I Ibis cases. 156 Perhaps more promising as a component of an exit strat­egy for the ICC would be something akin to what the IC1Y has called Category Two cases. These are cases in which the tribu­nal undertook investigations but never actually issued indict­ments. In an effort to close the IC1Y on the timeline desired by its U.N. funders, the IC1Y began passing Category Two case information, gathered in the course of its investigation, over to the domestic authorities. The Rome Statute provides for exactly this kind of infor­mation sharing. The Court may provide assistance to a State Party conducting an investigation into ICC crimes or serious crimes under the national law of the state, and such assistance shall include "[t]he transmission of statements, documents or 
156. In both the IC1Y and ICTR, this issue was formally incorporated into
the requirements that judges authorizing the referral of cases back to domes­
tic jurisdictions had to consider. See IC1Y, supra note 154 (stating that the 
IC1Y referral bench must be satisfied that "the accused will receive a fair 
trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out"); ICTR, supra note 154 (stating the same requirement). Until recently, the ICTR had 
consistently denied the Prosecutor's requests to refer cases to Rwanda. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-Rl lbis, Decision on the
Prosecution's Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule llbis, ,r 38
(Oct. 9, 2008) (upholding the trial chamber's refusal to grant the Prosecu­
tor's request to transfer the case to Rwanda under Rule 11 bis for reasons
including that Munyakazi's right to obtain the attendance of, and to ex­
amine, defense witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses called by
the prosecution cannot be guaranteed at this time in Rwanda); Prosecutor v.
Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-Ellbis, Decision on the Prosecution's
Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ,r 38 (Dec. 4, 2008)
(upholding the trial chamber's refusal to grant the Prosecutor's request to
transfer the case to Rwanda under Rule 11 bis, including on the grounds that
in Rwanda, Hategekimana "may face life imprisonment in isolation without
adequate safeguards, in violation of his right not to be subjected to cruel,
inhumane and degrading treatment"). However, in 2011, the trial chamber
permitted a referral to Rwanda for the first time. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi,
Case No. ICTR-2001-75-Rllbis, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Refer­
ral to Republic of Rwanda (June 28, 2011). The decision was upheld on
appeal with the requirement that the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights submit monthly monitoring reports on the case. Prosecutor
v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-01-75-ARllbis, Decision on Uwinkindi's Against
the Referral of his Case to Rwanda and Related Motions (Dec. 16, 2011).
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other types of evidence obtained in the Court of an investiga­
tion ... by the Court."157
The process only works if one has a receptive domestic 
jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not an opportunity that will be re­
alized in all instances. But where a state is interested in using 
material gathered by the ICC to further accountability, or 
could be incentivized to become interested by others con­
cerned about impunity in the face of a looming ICC exit, it 
could be useful for the ICC Prosecutor to adopt this Category 
Two-type approach as part of an overall exit strategy. 
Of course, this approach would also entail consideration 
of the obligations that may flow from it. Would the provision 
of information under article 93(10) burden the OTP with 
some level of responsibility ( and thus additional resources) for 
how that information is used? What about states that are keen 
to receive information from the Court but do not have the 
capacity to prosecute cases according to international stan­
dards?158 Unlike the Rule llbis cases, however, in instances
where the defendants were never indicted at the international 
level in the first place, the case for an extended period of re­
sponsibility is less clear.159
If the ICC were to follow the path of the IC1Y on this type 
of information sharing, then the provision of information to 
national authorities before the arrest warrant stage of proceed­
ings would not be enough to attach responsibility to the ICC 
for a defendant's subsequent treatment. As former IC1Y Dep­
uty Prosecutor David Tolbert explained with respect to Cate­
gory Two cases, " [ t] he national prosecuting authorities are on 
157. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 93(10) (b) (i).
158. See generally Heller, The Shadow Side of Compl,ementarity: The Effect of Arti­
de 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, supra note 125, at 255 (dis­
cussing the effect complementarity has on the likelihood defendants will re­
ceive due process in national proceedings). 
159. Views on this will undoubtedly diverge. There are good reasons for 
actors within the international community to be cautious of supporting pros­
ecutions with less than stellar human rights credentials, but as Frederic 
Megret argues, human rights organizations that push too far in the direction 
of demanding that domestic jurisdictions reform to the point where they are 
capable of taking on trials that are equivalent to what takes place in the 
Hague may be making the perfect the enemy of the good, and losing valua­
ble legal diversity in the process. Frederic Megret, Too Much of a Good Thing?: lmpl,ementation and the Uses of Comp!,ementarity, in l THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI­
NAL COURT AND CoMPLEMENTARl'IY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 1. 
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their own, for good or ill."160 With an eye both to resource 
constraints and to fears of a perceived or actual loss of inde­
pendence if the OTP engaged too closely with domestic prose­
cutions, the ICC's approach should probably be the same. This 
is not to say, however, that other actors outside the Court 
could not take on an oversight role.161 
CONCLUSION 
The first decade of scholarship on the ICC devoted much 
attention to issues related to the Court's entry into new situa­
tions. This scholarship reflected the focus of the Court itself 
and its need to garner a caseload to establish its viability in the 
face of much skepticism about whether the newly minted insti­
tution would actually work in the real world. But as the Court 
enters its second decade of operations, it is time to shift this 
focus to the new challenges that loom for the Court. 
This Article has described the reasons for the ICC to start 
thinking about when and how to exit situations in which it is 
currently active. The driving concern is that for the ICC to stay 
in any situation without developing an exit strategy risks creat­
ing a moral hazard scenario that undermines complementar­
ity, one of the key principles upon which the Court was 
founded. 
Beyond this "complementarity imperative" toward exit, 
the de facto permanent presence of the Court in any given 
situation may ultimately breed concerns over the Court's effi­
ciency, especially among the states that fund the Court. This 
would further strain what is already a precarious scenario for 
the Court, which is entirely dependent upon states for the re­
sources needed to conduct its operations. Already, current re­
source constraints have meant that, in order to enter new situ­
ations, the ICC prosecution is under-staffing existing situa­
tions. This approach is having a detrimental effect on the 
quality of its work and, in turn, the reputation of the Court. 
This Article has argued that the best way to address this re­
source squeeze would be for the Court to consider exiting 160. David Tolbert & Aleksander Kontic, IC1Y: Lessons in Complementarity,
in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARI'IY: FROM THE­ORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 1.161. Indeed, this is what the Organisation for Cooperation and Security inEurope is doing with respect to Category Two cases in Bosnia- Herzegovina. 
58 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POUT/CS [Vol. 47:1 some situations before entering new ones. Yet, even in a world of unlimited resources, the complementarity imperative would stand alone as a compelling reason for exit planning. While this Article has argued for the need to consider exit, it has also noted the risk that if such exit decisions are handled poorly, the Court will suffer reputational costs that will undermine its ability to carry out its mandate in the future. Yet, the question of how to handle exit decisions raises an im­mediate problem for the ICC, namely the complete dearth of guidance from existing statutory sources about how to make an exit decision. Filling this void, this Article has developed a framework to guide exit decisionmaking. While centered around a working definition of success, developed from both statutory and policy parameters, the framework recognizes that the ICC may need to exit situations under circumstances of only partial success or, indeed, failure. Even under these sub-optimal outcomes, however, there is the possibility that exit, signaled in advance, could have a catalytic effect on the activities of states, advanc­ing the statutory principles of cooperation and complementar­ity. Thus, as much as exit is a problem for the ICC, this Article has shown that exit may also have a salutary side, presenting the Court with an elegant means of aligning its resource man­agement with its statutory goals. As the first work to focus on the question of exit for the ICC, this Article has made the need for further scholarly atten­tion to this previously unexplored issue clear. But, although the question of exit is a novel one for the ICC, several of the dimensions involved in exit, such as prosecutorial discretion and complementarity, are issues that the ICC has been grap­pling with since its inception. Seen in this light, the question of exit provides scholars of international criminal law an op­portunity to revisit the literature written in the first decade of the ICC's existence and to assess the extent to which expecta­tions and assumptions within that body of work have been met. 
